


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Second Edition.

PRESENT SITUATION
OF
FRANCE & EUROPE.

LETTER

TO THE

RIGHT HON. LORD ERSKINE,

ON THE

Present Situation

OF

FRANCE AND EUROPE;

ACCOMPANIED BY

OFFICIAL AND ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.

Be assured, my Lords, of this (I hope you are already assured of it), that there is for this Country no separate safety, no separate peace—there is neither safety nor peace for England but with the safety and peace of Europe.

Speech of Lord Grenville, Nov. 4, 1813.

Oblatumque videt votis sibi mille petitem
Tempus, in extremos quo mitteret omnia casus
Æger quippe moræ, flagransque cupidine belli.

LUCAN.

SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1815.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

ALL the passages in the following Letter from French documents are translated by the writer, and he pledges himself for their fidelity.

His object has been to endeavour to offer a fair and consistent argument for the justice and policy of war, in the event of the allies being determined to revive and enforce *the spirit* of the 2d Article of the Treaty of Chaumont.

London, April 6th, 1815.

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TO THE

SECOND EDITION.

THIS Letter has been supposed by some persons to have been written for *party purposes*. The Writer takes this opportunity of stating, that he is not, in the slightest degree, connected with *any Political Party*, nor has he ever held any office; but that, in a moment like the present, he was anxious to state *prospectively* those opinions, which appeared to him to be connected with the best interests of the Empire, and to lend his feeble effort towards the correction of public opinion. The name of the distinguished person, to whom this Letter is addressed is a sufficient guarantee of the integrity of the Writer's intentions.

Monday, April 24th, 1815.

A

LETTER,

&c.

MY DEAR LORD,

NO person can be more fully aware than yourself, that the public mind in this country is no criterion of our situation; that it is subject to extreme alternations of depression or elevation, and that it is necessary to allow for this difference in any calculation upon the real posture of affairs. Wherever I go, I hear the keenest regret expressed for the errors of the past, and each person offers an antedated prophecy of the present crisis.

The solecism of the policy of the allies is descanted upon with bitter disappointment. To accept a voluntary abdication from a man, who was in a situation to obey,

and not to prescribe proposals ; to take away his empire, and to allow him to retain his title ; to deprive him of the command of one army, and yet to permit him to carry another with him, a sort of representative body selected from an infinite variety of regiments ; to take from him a navy, and yet to allow him a flag ; to permit him to retain the elements of power, the quality though not the quantity ; to keep alive the embers of slaked ambition, by allowing his island throne to comprise an epitomæ of his past greatness ; to omit every necessary precaution for preventing his escape, with the certain knowledge that the army was all powerful in France, that the interests of this army were involved in his return ; and that their affections, though repressed by the strong hand of power, had never been alienated from his person.

These, and a variety of collateral observations, all tending to the same mortifying retrospect, are to be heard in every society ; but I am anxious to take a prospective view of our situation, and to point

out that train of reflections, which appears to me to be alone calculated to induce a correct judgment as to the important question of the policy of peace or war. In furtherance of this object, let me invite your attention, to only a short period of what may be called the diplomatic history of Buonaparte, from the commencement of the Russian campaign to the present moment.

I shall add a few observations on his character, and on the political, as well as private, feelings which he is pledged to retain and enforce against this country. I shall offer nothing that is not supported by official documents or the most authentic information.

Then, at least, whether the decision is for peace or war, we shall thoroughly understand the character of the man, against whom we are to fight, or with whom we are to negotiate.

Buonaparte was at the zenith of his

power and greatness, at the commencement of the Russian campaign, in June 1812.

The object of this memorable expedition was to complete his plan of hermetically sealing the ports of Europe against England ; had he succeeded, he would have taken advantage of the discontent and privations, which this total cessation of commerce must have created in every country, to invite a simultaneous effort against *the tyrant of the seas*, the proximate cause of their distress, and thus to overthrow the only barrier which opposed his plans of universal empire. In his address to his army on the plains of Friedland, not deeming it prudent even to hint at his real sentiments, he accuses Russia of perfidy. “ La Russie est entraînée par la fatalité, ses destins doivent s’accomplir.” He promises his army a similar result with that of the first Polish war, and that a peace glorious for France shall prescribe “ une terme à cette orgueilleuse influence que la Russie a exercée depuis cinquante ans sur les affaires de l’Europe.”

When this domineering influence had been evinced, or against whom it had operated, would have been difficult to demonstrate, but historical truth was not more attended to in this than in other instances. His combinations, for once, failed of success. Destruction and death in every variety of shape, swept away three-fourths of the miserable agents of his ambition.

History presents no example of an equal sum of human misery condensed in so short a space of time. He returned to Paris, a lonely fugitive, with the unmitigated purpose of preparing fresh means for the subjugation of the world. It is interesting to observe the repentant tone of the Emperor of Austria, for not having intercepted his son-in-law in his last retreat. The following is an extract from the second Manifesto of that sovereign, 1813.

“ After the disasters of the Russian
 “ campaign, it was in our power to have
 “ scattered the remains of a once number-
 “ less, but now despairing and fugitive

“ army, but special considerations, and
 “ that humanity, on which we pride our-
 “ selves, combined with the loyalty of our
 “ policy, and the rectitude of our inten-
 “ tions, seduced as they were by his ex-
 “ quisitely insidious persuasions, retained
 “ us in inaction, when we might have de-
 “ cided the fate of Europe against *him*,
 “ who, after a series of infinite aggressions,
 “ had painfully humiliated us by pecu-
 “ niary extortions, and military conscrip-
 “ tions, and by parcelling out the inhe-
 “ ritage of our ancestors.”

After a short breathing time, we find a
 prospective development of Buonaparte's
 plan in the *Moniteur* of the 10th January,
 1813, in which he offers a new and bloody
 bill of fare for the ensuing season.

“ The campaigns of Spain and the
 “ north shall be carried on at the same
 “ time. 300,000 Frenchmen will be as-
 “ sembled in the course of February at
 “ Hamburg, on the Elbe, on the Rhine,
 “ and the Oder, independently of 200,000

“ men who are with the grand army ;
 “ the ensuing campaign is about to open
 “ *with a French army nearly twice as strong*
 “ *as the one assembled in the last.* At the
 “ same time, the French army in Spain
 “ will be reinforced and maintained at its
 “ full complément of 300,000 men.

“ England boasts of having altogether
 “ on foot 400,000 men, including her sea-
 “ men and marines. The population of
 “ France is at least quadruple. Upon
 “ this principle, if England has 400,000
 “ men the proportion of France should be
 “ at least triple. In subtracting from this
 “ calculation 200,000 men for her naval
 “ service, there will remain one million
 “ effective soldiers, which France may
 “ have on foot as easy as England can
 “ have 400,000.”

An extract from the registers of the
 Conservative Senate, of the 11th January,
 officially announces that 350,000 men are
 placed at the disposal of the Minister of
 War ; soon after, the venerable Camba-

ceres assures him, that these brave soldiers, which the nation adds to its numerous phalanxes, and which his Majesty is about to put in motion, will be the *Conquerors of Peace*; that darling project of peace, “ l’objet de tous vos desirs, de toutes vos victoires, et du sacrifice si souvent renouvelé de votre repos de vos affections, de vos jouissances les plus cheres.” Can any thing exceed the grossness of this imposture, and yet there are persons in this country who believed it “ au pied de la lettre.”

Early in February the Act of Regency was passed, and Napoleon assured the deputies of the departments at the Corps Legislatif, “ that he was desirous of peace, provided that it was honourable, and congenial to the interests of his empire.” On the 23d March, in his reply to the President of the Corps Legislatif, he employed this emphatic and remarkable language :

“ Invited by providence and the wishes of the nation to effect the establishment

“ of this empire, my progress has been
 “ gradual, uniform, consistent with the
 “ spirit of events, and with the interests
 “ of my people; *in a few years this great*
 “ *work will be accomplished*, and all that is
 “ in progress completely consolidated. I
 “ shall shortly place myself at the head of
 “ my troops, and confound the fallacious
 “ declarations of our enemies. In any ne-
 “ gociations, *the integrity of the empire*
 “ *never has nor ever shall be questioned.*”

In the Moniteur of the 8th May, it is
 announced, that the Empress has received a
 dispatch from the Emperor, announcing a
 complete victory near Lutzen, over the
 troops of the allies commanded by the
 Emperor of Russia and the King of Prus-
 sia. In his proclamation to his army, the
 day after the battle, nothing can exceed
 the insolence and exultation of unexpected
 prosperity, and of gratified revenge against
 the Russians.

“ Nous rejetterons *ces Tartares* dans
 “ leurs affreux climats, qu'ils ne doivent

“ pas franchir. Qu'ils restent dans leurs
 “ deserts glacés, séjour d'esclavage, de
 “ barbarie et de corruption.”

This anathema, however, did not prevent their bivouacking before the Hospital of Invalids in less than a year from its utterance. After the battles of Lutzen, Wurtzchen, and Bautzen, in which his numerical superiority prevailed against the heroic exertions of Prussia and Russia, Buonaparte professed an anxiety to treat for peace, the accomplishment of which did not occupy his thoughts for a moment; these were only bent upon regaining that ascendancy, which the reverses of the preceding winter appeared to have removed for ever. In the *Moniteur* of the 23d, the subject is thus introduced in the coldest manner :

“ The Emperor Napoleon has proposed
 “ the assembling of a Congress at Prague,
 “ for the purposes of a general pacifica-
 “ tion. On the part of France it is pro-
 “ posed, that her plenipotentiaries should

“ be invited to this Congress, as well as
 “ those of the United States of America,
 “ of Denmark, *of the King of Spain*, and
 “ of all their allies, on the opposite side,
 “ those of England, Russia, and Prussia,
 “ *the Spanish Insurgents*, and the other
 “ branches of the alliance opposed to
 “ France. At this Congress shall be
 “ laid down the bases of a permanent
 “ peace. If England refuses to accede,
 “ the Emperor is not less anxious to pro-
 “ mote the assembling at Prague of all the
 “ other plenipotentiaries of the belligerent
 “ powers, to regulate *a continental peace*.
 “ His Majesty even proposes to stipulate
 “ for an armistice at the moment of the
 “ meeting of the Congress, to prevent
 “ the further effusion of human blood!!
 “ These principles are conformable to the
 “ views of Austria; it remains to ascertain
 “ the disposition of the courts of England,
 “ Russia, and Prussia.”

The mysticism of Buonaparte's official documents is only calculated for the meridian of Paris. This proposal also contains

the most violent abuse of England. Its palpable object was to excite a jealousy of this country, and to gain time by offering an armistice—the anxiety about human blood is too absurd to demand a comment. It is sufficient to say, that his insidious proposals were ultimately rejected. The rupture of the Congress, the adhesion of Austria to the allies, the premature attack on Dresden, the death of Moreau, and the events which preceded and attended the decisive battle of Leipsic, are fresh in the recollection of every person.

The tide of French success began once more to ebb; it was in vain that the imperial bulletins claimed victory after victory; the retrograde movements of the French army furnished an invidious comment on their accuracy, even the farcical deputation of the captured colours to the Empress failed of its success. In the “*seance*” of the 15th November, the project of a *senatus-consultum* was presented, which placed 300,000 *more victims* at the disposition of the minister at war; in this whi-

ning rhapsody, the defection of Bavaria is bitterly inveighed against, and the partition of Poland deprecated *for the first time*, as furnishing a precedent to the same ravenous powers, for the spoliation and division of France. The warning words of the Empress, Maria Louisa, are quoted with awful solemnity. “ Je connois mieux que
 “ personne ce que nôt peuples auroient a
 “ redouter s’ils se laissoient jamais vaincre.” I have never attached any other meaning to these words, than an allusion to the degradation, which Austria had experienced from the successful tyranny of France; but, as there were yet men and money, the appeal to the sword was not to be abandoned; the chance of war was preferred to an adoption of just and reasonable principles, which, *at any moment*, could have commanded an honourable peace; but the real interests of France were to be balanced against the mortified vanity and insatiable ambition of her Emperor, who felt that abdication was less to be deprecated than the acceptance of those terms, which would leave him, what he called, a “ degraded

throne," nor was he insensible to the personal danger which might result from the dissolution of that "*prestige*," (which was the best security of a despot,) being succeeded by a state of inaction.

"La France," says the orator of the senate, "L'Europe entiere ont besoin de la
 "paix et la desirent mais *le peuple* Fran-
 "cois ne veut qu'une paix honorable et
 "digne de la gloire que nous avons ac-
 "quise, et pour l'obtenir, il est disposé a
 "mettre autant d'ardeur a se defendre,
 "que l'Europe liguée contre lui en met a
 "l'attaquer." On the 19th of December, Napoleon addressed the senators, counselors of state, and deputies of departments at the Corps Legislatif. He balanced the defections of his allies against the victories of his troops, and confessed, that even France would be in danger without energy and union. After various compliments to his own moderation and efficiency, he declared, that he had no opposition to offer to the restoration of peace; that he knew, and sympathized with the sentiments of the

whole French nation. “ Je dis,” he adds, “ des Français, parce qu’il n’en est aucun “ qui desirât la paix *au prix de l’honneur.*” In the “ seance” of the 27th December, 1813, Monsieur le Comte de Fontanes, in the name of the special commission, addressed the assembly ; and, after diluting the topics of the Emperor’s speech on the 19th ult. he entered a strong protest against the appeal of the allied powers to the people against their leaders, and then, with unexampled effrontery, inquired, “ against whom is this indirect attack “ levelled? against a great man, who de- “ served the gratitude of kings ; for, in re- “ establishing the throne of France, he “ choked up the volcano which threatened “ to overwhelm them all!” The Crown Prince of Sweden, the Emperor Alexander, and the Emperor of Austria, are successively propitiated in sentimental apostrophes’. He concludes by hoping, that time and place for a conference may be immediately named, as a prelude to an honourable peace. The Congress at Chatillon was consequently assembled, and, on

the 16th of March, 1814, the Declaration of the allied powers was published,* in which they record the motives of their assent to that Congress, and the causes of its rupture. They state, that the fatal experience of the past, had taught them not to consent to a suspension of arms during any negociation. The French plenipotentiary remonstrated against this resolution, and proposed, on the part of the Emperor, an armistice, founded upon a basis, conformable to that, which the allied powers thought necessary to the re-establishment of a general peace, and he offered, at the same time, an immediate surrender of those strong places, which France *was prepared* to give up.

To this proposal the plenipotentiaries replied, that twenty years of experience had taught them, that French *professions* were carefully to be *distinguished* from *intentions*; and, on their part, offered to sign immediately the preliminaries of peace,

* Appendix A.

which had all the advantages of an armistice, without entailing upon the allies the danger of a suspension of arms.

The French plenipotentiary was not authorized to assent to this proposal; unnecessary delays succeeded, till, on the 15th of March, he delivered a counter-project, which proved, that the misfortunes of France had not changed the spirit of her government: it was here proposed to identify with France, countries and people, “ que dans des siècles de domination ne fondroient pas dans la nation.” This was absolutely refused; and, upon this occasion, the allied sovereigns took the opportunity of renewing their sacred engagement, “ *never to lay down their arms, without having attained the great object of their alliance—the peace of Europe.*” “ Il est tems enfin (they add) que les princes puissent sans influence étrangère, veiller au bien-être de leurs peuples: que les nations respectent leur indépendance reciproque, que les institutions sociales soient à l’abri de *bouleversemens*

“ *journaliers*; les propriétés assurées, le
 “ commerce libre.”

On the morning of the 31st of March, the allied armies, having defeated the forces of Buonaparte, entered Paris. The memorable declaration of the Emperor of Russia, in the name of the allies, is dated on the same day at three o'clock in the afternoon. In this declaration, which is inserted at length in the Appendix,*—*They declare that they will never treat any more with Napoleon Buonaparte, nor with any of his family, and that they will acknowledge and guarantee whatever constitution the French nation shall adopt. They consequently invite the senate to establish a provisional government, to prepare such a form of constitution as may be suitable to the French nation.*

An extract from the registers of the conservative senate announces, that, on the evening of Friday, the 1st of April, a pro-

* Appendix A A.

visional government was appointed. In the proclamation of the general council of the department of the Seine, to the inhabitants of Paris, of the date of the 1st April,* they state, in the most forcible and impressive manner, and in a tone of indignant eloquence, the reasons which induce them formally to renounce their allegiance to Napoleon Buonaparte; and they conclude by expressing their most ardent wish that the monarchical government may be re-established in the person of Louis XVIII. and his legitimate successors. In the “seance” of the 3d April, the conservative senate,† after recording the repeated infractions of the constitution, and instances of despotic tyranny on the part of Buonaparte, declare that *he is dethroned*, and that the hereditary succession established in his family is abolished; that the French people and the army are released from their oath of allegiance to him. This was succeeded by two addresses, signed by the five members of the provisional

* Appendix B.

† Appendix C.

government; the one to the French army,* the other to the people.

An extract from the registers of the conservative senate, of Wednesday,† the 6th April, 1814, contains the recal of the Bourbons to the throne of France, “dans l’ordre ancien,” and the plan of a constitution, which Louis XVIII. is invited to accept. The *Moniteur*, of the 7th April, contains this paragraph: “Louis Stanislaus Xavier est rendu aux vœux des François par une charte constitutionnelle également avantageuse au peuple et à l’auguste famille destinée à le gouverner.”

At half past twelve o’clock, on the night of Tuesday, the 5th April, Marshal Ney wrote to Talleyrand,‡ stating, that he had been at Paris the day before, together with Macdonald and Caulincourt, with full powers to the Emperor of Russia, to de-

* Appendix D. † Appendix E. ‡ Appendix F.

fend the interests of the dynasty of the Emperor Napoleon, but that an *unforeseen event* having *suddenly* put a stop to the negotiations, *which were* otherwise in the *most promising* train, he saw distinctly that there were *no means* of averting the horrors of civil war from France, but by an adoption of the ancient dynasty; and that being convinced of this truth, he had just been with the Emperor Napoleon, to point out to him the *wishes of* the nation; he adds, that the Emperor, being convinced of the critical situation* in *which he himself* had placed France, and of his own personal incompetency to save her, had appeared willing to resign, and to consent to an unqualified abdication; and that he (Marshal Ney) hoped to be able to transmit the formal and authentic act of abdication in the course of the next day. However, the act

* No person can reasonably doubt of the treachery of Ney at this moment, and that an understanding took place between them, that when the prisoners were sent home, the allied forces removed, and other means and appliances exerted, that Buonaparte should unexpectedly land and appeal to the army to reinstate him.

of abdication is dated at the Palace of Fontainebleau, on Monday, 11th April, 1814, and is as follows:* “The allied
 “ powers having declared that the Em-
 “ peror Napoleon was the *only obstacle* to
 “ the restoration of peace in Europe, the
 “ Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath,
 “ declares, that he renounces for himself,
 “ and his heirs,† all claim to the thrones
 “ of France and Italy, and that there is no
 “ personal sacrifice, that of life not ex-
 “ cepted, which he is not prepared to
 “ make for the interests of France.”

On the same day, ‡ a secret treaty was signed at the same place, on the part of Napoleon, by Caulincourt, Ney, and MacDonald ; and, on the part of the allies, by Count Nesselrode.

In the first article of this treaty, Napoleon repeats the terms of his abdication.

* Appendix G.

† It is singular that the words “*for ever*” were not required to be inserted here.

‡ Appendix H.

In the third it is stated, “ that the *Island*
 “ *of Elba, selected by the Emperor Napo-*
 “ *leon himself, for the place of his residence,*
 “ shall form, during his life, a separate
 “ principality, with all rights of sove-
 “ reignty,” &c.

By the 17th article he is permitted to take with him, and retain as a guard, four hundred men, “ *de bonne volonté,*” including officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates.

In article 20, “ the high allied powers
 “ guarantee all the articles of the present
 “ treaty, and engage *that they shall be*
 “ *adopted and guaranteed by France.*”

On the 20th April, Buonaparte quitted Fontainbleau, and landed in Elba a few days afterwards.

In *professing* thus to give a sketch of the diplomatic history of Buonaparte, from the commencement of the Russian war to the present moment, there is no necessity

that I should allude to any transactions which have occurred from the date of his abdication, until I find, in the *Moniteur* of the 21st March, 1815, published under his influence, that he landed in France, at the head of his guards, in the department of the Var, on the 3d March, and that having been joined by all the troops which were sent to oppose him, he arrived at Paris on the 20th ult. the king having left the capital on the evening of the 19th ult.

By a decree, dated Lyons, and signed “Napoleon,” the chamber of peers and the chamber of deputies are declared *to be dissolved*; and, it is decreed, that the electoral colleges of the departments of the Empire shall be assembled at Paris, in the course of the month of May next, to take such measures as may be convenient to correct and modify “*our*” constitutions, conformably to the *interest and will of the nation*.

In the mean time, may it be permitted

to inquire, on what principle can the *political existence* of Buonaparte, as sovereign of France, be recognized by any sovereign, who was directly or indirectly a party to the Treaty of Fontainebleau?

What constitutes the political existence of an European sovereign? Is it not the law of hereditary succession, or the election of the nation, as expressed through its accredited organs, and the recognition of that election by the sovereigns of Europe? If that title is correct, Louis XVIII. is the sovereign of France, and Buonaparte is now an usurper. If the French nation choose deliberately to elect him Emperor, then his political existence *may revive* with relation to France; but with respect to Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, he can only be considered as an outlaw, having broken his virtual, if not his *actual* parole, and as manifestly guilty of an infraction of a solemn treaty concluded with his knowledge and under his authority, and signed by his appointed plenipotentiaries. His title to his crown is his sword, support-

ed by the treason of the army, and the apathy of the people.

It has been contended by some reasoners in this country, that Louis XVIII. had forfeited all right to the allegiance of his subjects, from having neglected to adhere to the letter of the constitutional charter, but Buonaparte is infinitely too subtle a logician, to adopt such untenable grounds of argument. He and his French adherents assert, that the Bourbon restoration was effected by the allies, in despite of the wishes of the French people; and that consequently, the imperial authority did never actually lapse, but remained as it were *in abeyance*, and that Buonaparte now resumes the reins of government, which, in theory at least, had never fallen from his hand. In the spirit of this reasoning* he

* Since writing the above, I meet with a passage in the extract from the Register of Deliberations of the Council of State of the "seance" of March 25th, 1815, which confirms the views which I had taken.

"In 1814, France was invaded by hostile armies; the capital was occupied. Foreigners created a *pretended pro-*

declares all the acts of the Bourbon administration null and void, and appears to consider that the government of the country is to be carried on until the meeting of the electoral body, by that momentum, which had been, as it were, imparted to the machine of government, by the former constitution, and whose force had only been suspended and not suppressed. Here the reasoning is correct, but the premises are *utterly false*; as the exposition, which I have made, by the circumstances of his abdication, compared with the official documents, cannot fail to establish. Upon these grounds, and after mature consideration, I am disposed to think, that the allies are completely justified in employing the language of *the following part* of their declaration*, “ By thus breaking the convention which has established him in the Island

visional government. They assembled a minority of the senators, and compelled them, contrary to their mission, and contrary to *their* will, to destroy the existing constitution, to overthrow the imperial throne, and to recal the family of the Bourbons.”

* Appendix I.

of Elba, Buonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence (i. e. his *political existence*) depended; by appearing again in France, with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested “to the universe, that there can be neither peace nor truce with him.”

If they are not justified in this part, at least, of their Declaration, then all treaties are a mere fallacy, and the corps diplomatique may be abolished “*en masse*” thro’out Europe. The code of public law and of private honour will be equally useless, and new principles must be established for the intercourse of mankind.

But, as the melancholy truth cannot be denied, that Buonaparte is virtually on the throne, and commands the resources of France, and as a cry is heard on every side, of the infatuation of the “war faction” in this country, we must advert to other points, which more materially affect ourselves. It is fruitless to comment any

longer upon “ the genius and dispositions” of the French government or people, as distinct from Buonaparte, *as long as he* retains the *supreme* power, it is to his “ genius and “ dispositions” that the attention of Europe must be turned ; we must consider the principles and character of the man, who *individually* represents the nation over which he presides, who has declared *himself to be the Throne*,* to whose exclusive keeping, the honour and interests of France are surrendered, who wields her energies at will, by the master-key which he possesses to the passions of the army, and who commands her resources by the intensity of his despotism.

* Since the return of Buonaparte, he has been endeavouring to cajole the republicans. The patriot Carnot swallowed the bait of a title, and an office ; the jingle of citizenship has found its way into the addresses and replies of the new cabinet. He has pretended to abolish the censure of the press ; but the sleep of that man, who impeached his pretensions or conduct, would be the sleep of death. In the appendix K, will be found a *correct* copy of his memorable answer of the 1st January, 1814, to the Legislative Body, which comprises *his* code of civil government.

The character of this person has been imperfectly appreciated in this country, when resolved into its simple elements, and collated with his career, they mutually explain and elucidate each other. From the earliest record of his history, he has been one “ unchanged unchangeable.”

In a period of tranquillity, he would have perished on a scaffold ; in times of revolution, he has figured upon a throne ; he has lived like Cæsar, and may perish like Cataline.

In a work published in 1799, by Wright, Piccadilly, entitled “ Copies of Original “ Letters from the Army of General Buonaparte in Egypt,” there is a fac simile of his hand-writing, taken from a letter, written to Joseph Buonaparte ; and, in page 100, there is a translation of *extracts* from it. The rest of the letter was suppressed, from motives of delicacy, as it partly related to subjects of a private nature. In this letter, which is of unquestionable authenticity, Buonaparte desires his brother

to secure for him a small country house in Burgundy, as he is determined to retire altogether from public life.—He paints the agonizing listlessness of his feelings, that he is “blasé” for every thing, and that every thing is “épuisé” for him; that life has no interest in a career of restricted exertions: his tone is that of the despairing angel, who thinks it “better to reign in hell, than serve in heaven.”

In Nov. 1799, he returned to France, and landed in the department of the Var—to use his own words—“Le trône était vacant, je l’ai saisi”—fifteen years of progressive aggrandizement have preserved his mind, from preying upon itself. The bloody page of the history of these years forms the best comment of his self-drawn character. His late “exile upon a rock” has revived these dormant symptoms, and he awaits with restless impatience the moment, when he can again resume his insatiable purpose, and blend the experience with the energy of the past.

His ambition, as he himself implies, is boundless ; he is not weak enough to suppose, that the accomplishment of any object would satisfy its cravings ; his pleasure is in the pursuit.—Happiness has been well defined to consist in “ a destiny in unison “ with our faculties.” Buonaparte pursues the phantom upon this principle, he proposes the conquest of the civilized world, as his “ object :” his first combinations have been defeated, but he has life and health, increased military reputation and efficiency, unimpaired vigour of mind, and unrelenting consistency of purpose—even the zest of recommencement presents an increased stimulus. To cloke his designs, he will borrow the language of candour and humility ; he will employ such exquisite art, that those, who have not reflected on his past conduct, may be duped by the fascination of his present professions.

He meditates revenge who least complains,
 And like a lion slumbering on his way,
 Or sleep-dissembling, while he waits his prey.
 His fearless foes within his distance draws,
 Constrains his roaring, and contracts his paws,

Till at the last, his time for fury found,
He shoots with sudden vengeance from the ground.

DRYDEN.

He has been stigmatized as a coward—the accusation is unjust; he is not a Paulus Æmilius, prodigal of life, but employs it upon the best commercial principles; and never hazards an extensive risk, without the probability of a commensurate profit; if the moment arrives, when his deliberate judgment pronounces it necessary, he presents himself to danger without anxiety or hesitation.

He has been reprobated as cruel.—He is not cruel in the *active* signification of the word—he is utterly indifferent and callous to sentiments of humanity, when they interfere with his pursuit.—He is a modern philosopher in the strictest sense of the term.—There is no individuality in his conceptions: if five hundred thousand men perish in a campaign, he regrets the inconvenience of *his own* loss, but never feels a moment's remorse for the sacrifice. Their fate is mingled with that of former genera-

tions ; and, if their doom is antedated, it has been but for a moment. The spring of population is amply sufficient to supply their place, and a slight fiscal encouragement to marriage, or diminution of penalty for illegitimate births, will expedite the purposes of nature, and operate as a sinking fund upon the debt incurred. If any individual is obnoxious to him, it is a sort of duty which he owes to his high situation to remove the nuisance.—Whether it is a prince of the House of Bourbon, seized in the sanctuary of a neutral territory, or an itinerant vender of suspicious pamphlets, he signs their death warrant with equal apathy, and retires to rest, “ with the crimes, but without “ the compunctious visitings” of conscience, which Shakespeare has given to his prototype, Richard.

He has been proclaimed false and perfidious—and with reason ; but perfidy and falsehood are in *his* catalogue of virtues. He acknowledges no legitimate motive of action, except interest : being utterly destitute of religious and moral feeling, he

values men in proportion to their extent of finesse and consistency of purpose.—If an officer breaks his parole, he compliments him upon his ingenuity; if a man betrays his friend, or forfeits a trust, he values him as a being superior to the contemptible prejudices of moralists and bigots; and considers him as an eligible agent in his transactions with mankind.—It is thus that he has greeted the Prince of Moskwa, the Marshal Ney, who, when he parted from Louis XVIII. the sovereign to whom he had sworn a voluntary allegiance, drew his sword half out of the scabbard, and solemnly devoted it to the service of his master, pressed the king's hand to his heart, and called heaven and earth to witness that the last drop of his blood should be shed in the cause of the Bourbons.—This man

“ For since the howling wild,
Disclaims him, man he must be styl'd,”

retired from this scene of stage effect, and within that day, prostituted his services to an usurper and a tyrant.

Buonaparte has permitted private justice to be generally enforced by the laws, because he cannot be subjected to any inconvenience by their operation, and men are deceived and prone to confound private with public justice. He admires Alexander and Cæsar as conquerors, but despises the clemency of the one, and the high sentiments of the other. But the distinguishing quality of his mind, to which his greatness is mainly to be attributed, is his appreciation of the character of the people over whom he has reigned, and the dexterous manner in which he employs moral effect to excite a voluntary subservience to his purpose. He knows that *vanity is the basis of the national character*; his object has been to cherish this feeling, and to correct and identify, by a thousand associations, the personal vanity of the people with *his* person, actions, name, and dynasty. Columns, statues, and arches bear testimony to his glory; the Code Napoleon is the only code of law; the current coin, the creation and embellishment of palaces, the patronage of the arts

and sciences, are all associated with his name: even since his return he has ordered the inscription of “Musée Napoleon” to be placed on the gate of the Louvre.

It is thus that he has obtained a mortgage of the most indefinite extent upon the public opinion; a series of reverses, and the presence of foreign invasion from every point of the compass, for a moment prevented his foreclosing it with effect; but, after the interval of one short year, and in two addresses, which are master-pieces of apposite declamation, he awakens every association which can weaken any sentiment of loyalty towards the Bourbons, and rouse to enthusiasm the spirit of the army.

In his address to the people, he accuses Augereau and Marmont of treason, as an apology for military failure; and, to relieve their mortification upon that point, as well as to remove all tarnish from his own reputation, he converts the fatal and mistaken lenity of the allies into an act exclusively emanating from himself—a personal

sacrifice for the benefit of France. “ I
 “ consulted only the interest of my coun-
 “ try; I exiled myself upon a rock in the
 “ middle of the sea.” He even avails
 himself of any dormant revolutionary
 spirit, by contending, that a national go-
 vernment, and a new dynasty, were the
 natural consummation of that glory, which
 had resulted to France from the effects of
 the Revolution.

He then denounces Louis XVIII. as a
 mere sovereign of the allies, a king of
 shreds and patches; and, with some inge-
 nuity, at the total expense of *historical*
truth, offers a seeming analogy, in which
 he introduces the name of the Prince Re-
 gent of England. To inspire confidence,
 he solemnly promises ignorance and obli-
 vion of the past, and introduces an un-
 meaning phrase of “ circumstances being
 of such a nature as to be above all human
 organization,” but which is quite suited to
 the analytical powers of his readers.

In his address to the soldiers, he assumes

a more energetic tone. “ Shall those,
 “ whom, during twenty-five years, we
 “ have seen traversing all Europe to raise
 “ up enemies against us, who have passed
 “ their lives in fighting against us in the
 “ ranks of foreign armies, *cursing our fine*
 “ *France*—shall they pretend to command
 “ and controul our eagles, on which they
 “ have not dared even to look.” ‘Thus,’ in
 the same sentence, the slothful adherents
 of the House of Bourbon are accused of
having fought against France, and of *not*
having dared to fight against her! He
 then represents himself as having braved
 all sorts of obstacles and perils for their
 sakes; entreats them to mount the tri-
 colour cockade, that badge so identified
 with fame and victory; he strings together
 a series of names of talismanic influence:
 “ Recover those eagles which you had at
 “ Ulm, at Austerlitz, at Jena, at Eylau,”*
 &c. &c. in other words, I pledge myself to
 lead you again against all these nations:

* How consistent the tone of this address is with the paci-
 fic exposé of Caulaincourt?—Second Edition.

he then scoffingly adverts to the 19 years residence of the king in a foreign country, and tauntingly recommends him to return and complete his glorious reign there. Then succeeds a tirade about honourable wounds, and scars, and glory, and victories, and the eagle flying from steeple to steeple, and the hacknied apostrophe of the soldier, exclaiming, "And I, too, was
 " of the grand army, which delivered
 " Paris from the foul blot which treason
 " and the presence of the enemy imprinted
 " on it." He concludes, by proclaiming eternal shame to those guilty Frenchmen, who fought for 25 years with the foreigner to tear the bosom of their country.

Such has been the metaphysical experiment, which, united with a deep-laid conspiracy, has replaced him on the throne. His whole career has been marked by similar resources; he has been uniformly aware, that it was possible to supply physical force by means of moral effect applied at a proper moment; that, by a due application of this agent, an inferior force might

be rendered competent to contend with a superior, uninfluenced by similar electric impulse—that the strength of enthusiasm was positive strength. If possible he selected the anniversary of a victory for the day of battle; “this is the dawn of Marengo, this the sun of Austerlitz;” it is well known, that in action, he would send twenty aides-de-camp to different parts of the army, each of whom announced his approaching arrival in a particular division; and, while he was at a windmill with a telescope, the soldiers were swept down by hundreds, as they supposed in the immediate presence of the emperor. After the battle every one boasted that the emperor had been near them, and though no person had actually seen him, yet his presence was never the subject of doubt.

The very cry of “Vive l’Empereur,” was sufficient, when once excited, to have shaken the allegiance of the French army; that cry, identified with their proudest recollections, whether of victory in the plains of Austria, of sustained suffering in

the wilds of Russia, or of indignant, though orderly retreat, after the battle of Leipsic, still had its charms; and, when contrasted with their present state, the stimulus of defeat and privation was preferable to the torpor of inactivity.

Buonaparte had long availed himself of the phrase of “Vive l’Empereur!” his bulletins are crowded with records of the troops advancing to the charge with this exclamation. In the bulletin of the battle of Lutzen, the wounded soldiers are introduced as “*faisant trêve à leur douleur en criant Vive l’Empereur.*”

Such appears to be the simple means, by which this extraordinary man produces the most unexpected results.

To suppose that his reverses and retirement have taught him to prize and practise moderation, is an impeachment of common sense. His conversations with those who visited him in Elba, were not couched in the tone of the mathematician

retired from the world to pursue neglected science, or of the general, whose only object was to record the annals of military exertion; they were for the most part political, and betrayed the regrets of the past, and hopes of the future: the broodings of a mortified despot, who assumed a tone of contempt and stoical indifference, to check suspicion, and secretly grasped at the opinions and suggestions of all who approached him.

If a superior being was to guarantee to Buonaparte a long reign of uninterrupted prosperity, the peaceable succession of his dynasty, the progressive improvement of France, in all the arts and principles which are favourable to happiness, in rational religion, practical morality, in the enjoyment of civil liberty, in real power, population and energy—if this offer was made upon condition that he should abstain from all wars, which had not for their object the restoration of the balance of power in Europe, he would reject the offer with disdain. It is necessary to *his happiness*

that he should be in a state of progressive and indefinite expansion—it would be preferable to him to become a captain of banditti, than to hold empire upon terms of limitation.

The existence of this man, as ruler of France, is therefore dangerous to the repose of the world ; to avoid this danger, you must regenerate his nature, and that of the Janizaries who have restored him, or you must remove the one, and crush the other into inefficiency. The French people, degraded and debased as they are, beyond historical parallel, are admirable agents for his purpose. He delights in high play ; his stake is universal empire ; his cards are conscriptions ; he has only to play them out, and call for a fresh pack, and they are purveyed to him without a murmur, by the abject slaves of his creation. In a word, the pursuit of military glory is his “ second nature ;” it alone offers sufficient stimulus to relieve him from the weight of that listlessness which would destroy him, if his eyes were only to be

gladdened by the sight of a free, peaceable, and prosperous population.

Such is his nature, and, to use the words which he himself lately employed, with reference to the restriction of the natural limits of France, by the annexation of Belgium to Holland, “ On peut il est vrai
 “ la contraindre maintenant, on peut
 “ même compresser l’air, mais à la fin il
 “ éclatera avec *le bruit du tonnerre.*” As Lord Stanhope justly observed, in the house of lords, “ He is one of the vilest ty-
 “ rants that ever existed, who makes war
 “ merely for the pleasure of carrying it on,
 “ and for the purpose of making military
 “ establishments to injure mankind.”

Volumes of official documents might be compiled, to prove the extent of his rancorous hatred to this country, which he has endeavoured to inspire throughout the circuit of his empire; but, if we only trace his sentiments from the commencement of the year 1813, when misfortune might have taught him other feelings, we shall find

that his unyielding purpose—a purpose which he could not even conceal with the specious veil of official phraseology—remained in its full force.

This rooted detestation arises simply from the obstacles which England has interposed in his path; her name, her arms, and her subsidies, have baffled his profoundest combinations: she is the object upon which the line of European independence has been formed; her voice has been the rallying point to enslaved nations; her example the stimulus which impelled them to persevere and conquer.

In Maret's report, of the 9th January, 1813, the English government is accused of having neglected no sort of intrigue to influence the sentiments of the sovereigns, allies of Bonaparte; but finding this measure impracticable, “they attempted to
“ shake the fidelity of the people, by corrupt
“ agents in courts, by vile emissaries in the
“ field, and by false enthusiasts in the very
“ schools and seminaries of learning;” and,

as a counterbalance to these atrocious attempts, the minister coolly proposes a levy of 350,000 men!

The *Senatus Consultum*, of Jan. 11, is one continued invective against England.

England, dreading a war with the United States of America, and anticipating the unsuccessful issue of the peninsula contest, was desirous of creating a war between France and Russia.

England has been the source of all the continental coalitions, which have been successively annihilated by the genius of the Emperor. It is the emissaries of England, who, by preaching Antigallican doctrines in all the courts of Europe, have banished peace and repose from the earth. It is England,* who brought on the last

* The Duke of Bassano, in a complaining letter to Baron Krusemark, on the defection of Prussia, gives another explanation of the causes of this Russian campaign; it would be difficult to find a parallel example of useless

Russian campaign of 1812, “ Qui à couté
 “ à la Russie la devastation de ses plus
 “ belles provinces, le repos à l’Europe, des
 “ regrets à l’humanité.” It is thus that
 England disunites and divides those coun-
 tries which she cannot rule over; “ ainsi
 “ elle prepare la ruine des états qu’elle ne
 “ peut soumettre a son système.”

Even in the exposé of the state of the
 empire, presented to the Corps Legislatif,
 in the “ seance” of the 25th of Februa-
 ry, by M. de Montalembert, minister of
 the interior, a retrograde attack is volun-
 teered upon us; that, taking advantage of
 our naval superiority, after the battle of
 La Hogue, in 1692, and the termination

blasphemy, but it was not intended to alarm the baron, but
 to please the citizens of Paris.

“ Le doigt de la Providence est empreint dans les évé-
 “ nemens de cet hiver (one should naturally suppose that
 “ he was on the point of alluding to the destruction of the
 “ host of the modern Pharaoh) *Elle* les a produits pour
 “ demasquer les faux amis et signaler les amis fideles, et
 “ *elle a donné* a S. M. assez de puissance pour assurer les
 “ triomphes des uns, et le chatiment des autres.”

of the war of 1758, we imposed commercial treaties upon France, which are disgraceful to her annals, as they were destructive of her industry; and that when we thought it expedient to make war for the sake of oppressing her commerce, or possessing ourselves of her colonial establishments, we found her destitute of the means of maritime resistance. “*Delà,*” says the expositor, “*ce mépris que le* “ *peuple d’Angleterre temoignoit en toute* “ *occasion pour nous.*”

On the 23d of March, 1813, Buonaparte assured the Corps Legislatif, that all his designs, all his enterprizes had only one object—the prosperity of the empire which he wished for ever to separate from the effects of English influence.

I have already mentioned, that in his proposition for a Congress at Prague, 24th of May, 1813, he had indulged in a violent attack upon England. “*It is doubtful,*” says he, “*whether England will con-* “ *sent to submit her egoistical and unjust*

“ principles to the judgment and opinion
 “ of the universe; for there is no power,
 “ however inconsiderable, who does not
 “ in the first instance lay claim to those
 “ privileges which are adherent to sove-
 “ reignty, and which are solemnly ratified
 “ by the articles of the Treaty of Utrecht,
 “ relating to maritime law.”

“ If England, in compliance *with that*
 “ *egoistical spirit, on which her policy is*
 “ *founded*, refuses to co-operate in this
 “ great work of the peace of the world,
 “ *because she wishes to exclude the whole*
 “ *universe from that element which com-*
 “ *prises three fourths of the globe,”* the
 Emperor is not less anxious to assemble
 the other plenipotentiaries, &c. &c.

On the 24th of August, Monsieur le
 Comte Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angelay,
 one of the orators appointed to present
 the project of the Senatus Consultum, pro-
 nounced a furious philippic against Eng-
 land. He reminded the senate that he
 had already stigmatised the English Cabi-

net as "l'Artisan de la guerre," the justice of which appellation he said had been fully confirmed by late events. He talks of France resuming an attitude worthy of herself, and of expediting the moment, when England shall no longer apply the treasures of Mexico to the destruction of Spain. Those treasures, which she purloins from them, and with which she fosters her Indian commerce, prolongs her monopoly in Europe, bolsters up her tottering credit, bribes her corrupted emissaries, and pays those fatal subsidies to the cabinets which she deludes!!!

In his address to the senators of the 19th of December, 1814, Buonaparte said, let not posterity record of us that we have sacrificed the first interest of our country, that we have recognized those laws, which *England has vainly attempted for four centuries to impose upon France.*

Such are the means which he has employed to generate and mature sentiments of jealousy and suspicion against this coun-

try; it is thus, like Hamilcar, he has sworn the French nation to interminable hatred against us, and has irrevocably pledged himself against the fundamental principles of our national greatness.

If the view which I have taken of the character of Buonaparte shall be deemed incorrect; if he does not merit the imputation of the most selfish ambition, in having rejected honourable terms of peace after the battle of Lutzen, and still more so at the Congress at Chatillon; if the allies were not justified with reference to the best interests of the civilized world, in refusing to treat with him, or with any of his family, after the capture of Paris; and if the suspicions which they entertained of his puny faith have not been confirmed by his escape from Elba in despite of the fatal generosity extended towards him, and of the solemn Treaty by which he was bound; if his career does not mark him as a man of blood, "let loose to scourge mankind," whose heart is callous to the sympathies of private feeling, as to sentiments of public

honour; as one who is virtually incapable of sincerely adopting a line of pacific policy, who is replaced on the throne by a band of adherents, whom he has promised to lead to victory and plunder :

“ At tu quos scelerum superos? quas rite vocasti

“ Eumenidas, Cæsar? Stygii quæ numina regni

“ Infernum nefas et mersos nocte furores

“ Impia tam sævè gesturus bella.”

If, I repeat, this view is unjust and inapposite, I may at least be permitted to quote some high authorities, the extent and tone of whose accusations cannot be explained away upon mere feelings of political animosity.

Extract of a Letter of the Crown Prince of Sweden, to his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, March 23d, 1813.

“ Your system, sir, is to prevent the
 “ extension or establishment of those rights
 “ which nations have received from na-
 “ ture. The right of commercial inter-

“ course, of mutual assistance, of reciprocal relations of peace and amity.

Extract from the Proclamation of the Prince Royal of Sweden, 3d March, 1814.

“ He (Buonaparte) endeavours by horrible calumnies, which he promulgates against the Allies and their brave troops, to make those dangers and misfortunes of a war, *which is directed solely against himself*, recoil upon the whole nation.”

Extract from the 3d Manifesto of the Emperor of Austria, 1813.

“ That phrenzy of power, that extravagant passion of subjugating Europe, still blinded him in despite of his real interest and happiness,* still blinded *that man*, who but the other day an

* This would be just, as applied to the “ real interests and happiness of France,” but Buonaparte is incompetent to feel any interest or happiness, except in the indulgence of his ambition.

“ *obscure individual*, could now have re-
 “ posed tranquil on a Throne, have con-
 “ firmed the happiness of a brilliant mo-
 “ narchy, and mingled his blood with
 “ that of a race of kings.”

*Extract from the Manifesto of the Emperor
 of Russia.*

“ And this Europe, on the point of
 “ becoming the prey of a *monster*, might
 “ finally (in the event of certain results,)
 “ recover her independence and tranquil-
 “ lity, and of this bloody Colossus, which
 “ menaces the continent with its criminal
 “ temerity, there should only remain an
 “ eternal sentiment of horror and of pity.”

*Extract from a Proclamation of the Duke
 of Wellington to the Inhabitants of France.
 Head Quarters at Tolosa, 27th January,
 1814.*

“ Do not doubt, that the allies will
 “ succeed in breaking the oppressive yoke
 “ under which the *immeasurable ambi-*

“ *tion of a modern Attila* condemns you
 “ to groan. It is your blood that is the
 “ price of his triumphs, it is by the de-
 “ struction of your devoted race that he
 “ meditates the foundation of the grandeur
 “ of his *execrable dynasty*. A stranger to
 “ all the sympathies and feelings of na-
 “ ture, to those even which *belong to a gen-*
 “ *tleman*, his life, his existence is dedicated
 “ to destruction.”

*Extract from the Proclamation of General
 Moreau.*

“ Profoundly ungrateful, ferocious by
 “ temperament; Incest, Assassination—all
 “ those crimes, from which mankind re-
 “ volt, are familiar to him. He forms the
 “ misery of the whole world. I attest all
 “ the nations of whom he is the scourge,
 “ Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, Prus-
 “ sia, Holland. Let them raise their voice,
 “ and pronounce his judgment.”

If it is argued, that whatever character
 he might once have deserved is now no

longer applicable, that he has changed his policy, and puts on “the new man,” that he proposes to abide by the treaty of Paris, and, for *once* to keep his word, that he has renounced all ideas “du grand Empire, dont, depuis quinze ans, il* n’avoit encore que posé les bases.”—I can only reply that I am compelled to distrust every syllable which he utters, and to plead the history of the past, as a justification of my incredulity. A year has not elapsed, since he renounced, in a much more solemn manner, the thrones of France and Italy ; but what did a verbal renunciation avail ; where is the security of an Imperial asseveration?

The policy of war appears to many persons to resolve itself into a question of *means* ; I cannot doubt that the means of the allies are fully adequate to redeem the

* What can the words “du grand Empire” placed in opposition to the *Empire* of France signify, except the Universal Empire of the World, and thus his former and fixed determination to have accomplished that object, is unblushingly avowed by himself—his motto will be “ce qui est différé n’est pas perdu.”

pledge of their late Declaration; at all events, if the united energies of England, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal, Holland, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and the minor powers of Germany, combined with the neutrality of other states, (if such there should be found) are insufficient to tear down a faithless usurper from the throne of France, whose very nature and temperament is hostile to the repose of the world—where is the golden dream of the restored balance of power, which has delighted these our latter days?

I feel the most implicit confidence, that whenever the allies enter the territories of the great nation, the population of the south-west of France will instantly be found in a state of organized civil war; for their vanity is as much identified with the House of Bourbon, as that of the army with Buonaparte.

But, it may be asked—can our finances support a war?—Is not the experiment of trusting to this man preferable to the cer-

tain embarrassments which must accrue from a resumption of a war establishment? Upon the most deliberate reflection, I am disposed to think, that, if the allies unanimously resolve to act up to the spirit of their late Declaration of the 13th ult. the most vigorous hostilities are infinitely more safe than a temporary postponement of the evil hour, and the possible disunion of the most politic as well as legitimate confederacy, that was ever combined for the interests of mankind. For the interval of peace will be short, and will be measured by his capacity of reviving the contest; for, sooner or later, a monsoon of blood will set in, which will shake the fabric of European independence to its foundation.

But will it be necessary materially to increase our war establishment?—The most beneficial assistance which this country can afford, is by means of a subsidy strictly and economically applied, under the superintendence of accredited agents. The public opinion is adverse to this mode of assistance; but it is acknowledged, that we

can purchase the services of men on the continent at an infinitely less rate than at home; and that we can thus bring into the field a much greater body of men for the same expense: as the occasion would only be temporary, the country would not be encumbered with an additional and useless establishment. In the ninth article of the treaty, signed at Chaumont, on the 1st March, 1814, "His Britannic Majesty reserves the right of furnishing his contingent to the requiring power, in foreign troops in his pay; or to pay annually to that power a sum of money, at the rate of twenty pounds sterling per annum, for each man for infantry, and thirty pounds sterling for cavalry, until the stipulated succour (of 60,000 men, viz. 50,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, artillery, and ammunition) be complete." Our pecuniary engagements, under this treaty, could not have exceeded 1,300,000*l.* The out-fit would be supplied from this country, for the benefit of our manufactures.—But, as a mere question of economy, if Buonaparte continues on the throne of France, what government would

venture to hazard the safety of this country, by reducing the peace establishment to even its anticipated average? Let the government announce without reserve to the nation, that in *the certain event* of a fortunate result of war, (if war should be decided upon), the intended peace establishment of nineteen millions should experience a most *material diminution*. If the justice and policy of a war (to use the language of the Crown Prince) *against Buonaparte*, could be brought home to the conviction of the people of this empire, I have no hesitation in expressing a confident opinion, that the financial means of supporting the short, but sanguinary struggle, would not be found wanting. If the impatience of taxation has been lately expressed in murmurs “loud and deep,” it must be remembered, that the people are scarcely to be blamed for expecting that peace, the purchase of their blood and treasure, should bring in its train its wonted blessings, and that they were consequently indisposed to submit to any incumbrances; which did not *appear* to be justified by the

relative situation of the country. The time has been, when Buonaparte extended his power from the Baltic to the extreme shores of the Adriatic; when he was the idol of a numberless population, intoxicated with his greatness. And yet England did not shrink from contending with him single-handed; but is the relaxing effect of the suspension of effort so great, that she now hesitates, though supported by an auxiliary force of 600,000 men, commanded by generals, who have plucked the laurel from his brow; united in a just and necessary cause, against a country, disunited, dissatisfied, and alarmed; dragooned into a sullen and negative obedience; on the point of becoming a prey to civil war, and still suffering from the *partial* horrors of a recent invasion?

We must forget that any time has elapsed since the capture of Paris. Buonaparte has promised to forget that he has been master of nations, and all that has been done or written since his abdication; we, too, must have our "oblivious antidote." We must forget that the disturber

of Europe has been prostrate at our feet; his personal freedom, his very life the boon of the conquerors. We must forget that we expected that a mild government would conciliate a band of robbers, inoculated with the ferocity and mad ambition of their captain, who were trained in his lyceums, and taught to worship him, instead of a god. We must forget that we had hoped that the coarse manners, and still coarser minds of the Buonaparte school, would have progressively amalgamated with the polished manners of the remains of the Court of Louis XVI. The Bourbons have been accused, in general terms, of impolicy and weakness;* but were they impolitic to place a manly and unreserved confidence

* It was remarked lately with much point, that Louis XVIII. was not adapted to suit the French nation; for "he was a Christian and a gentleman," and they detested the one, and despised the other. He has been blamed (and, in a political sense, justly) for his mildness and humanity.

"Mild, easy, humble, studious of their good,
 "Inclin'd to mērcy, and averse from blood;
 "If mildness ill with stubborn Israel suit,
 "His crime is God's beloved attribute.

in those public functionaries, who might be presumed to be the accredited organs of the French nation, who had publicly transferred their allegiance to them, and accompanied that transfer with every private protestation of fidelity.

“ Some by their monarch’s fatal mercy, grown,
 “ From pardon’d rebels, kinsmen to the throne,
 “ Were rais’d in power and public office high,
 “ *Strong bands, if bands ungrateful men could tie.*”

It is true, that the superfluous devotion of one prince might disgust his cortége of atheists: that the hasty disposition of another, though succeeded by pledges of conciliation, would only teach them to resent the affront, and despise the apology. That a princess, the daughter of their murdered king, might offend by an impolitic simplicity, when tinsel shew and effect had preoccupied the taste of the court, and whose purity of mind, and reserve of manners, the chastened result of sorrow and resignation, might operate as a satire upon their contrasted character.

But such causes as these are *not* sufficient to account for the phænomena which now astonish Europe, they are to be explained on other principles, which have been detailed at length. The sum of human happiness had increased, and was increasing, amongst the people; the proximate cause of the secession of the House of Bourbon, has been the presence of Buonaparte in their kingdom, but the remote and predominating one is to be found in the degradation and demoralization of France. This state, the natural result of anarchy engrafted upon republicanism, and in its turn absorbed by despotism, was fostered and cherished by himself; it was the main fulcrum of his power, it stifled individual opinion, it destroyed every germ of civil liberty, and generated a selfish apathy, which aspired to nothing beyond the praise of servility. In the short space of the last ten months, a new light has broken in upon the nation, but not sufficient to dissipate the darkness of their moral horizon. From the highest to the lowest, there *has*

been an utter abandonment of honour and principle.

Mr. Burke has said, that the age of chivalry was past, and that a race of calculators and economists had succeeded; but what language would his indignant spirit have uttered, had he witnessed the perfidy of some of the marshals of France;* of Marshal Ney, whose merits I have recorded; of Augereau, who taunted the Emperor with cowardice, in the zealous adhesion which he sent to the Bourbons, in last May—who then betrayed them to the

* Soult's adhesion to the Bourbons, appeared to speak the sentiments of the army :

“ *The nation* having manifested its wishes respecting the
 “ abdication of Napoleon, and the establishment of Louis
 “ XVIII. on the throne of our ancient kings, the army,
 “ *essentially obedient and national*, will confirm the will
 “ of the nation.”

With a slight alteration, it may suit his counter-adhesion to Buonaparte.

The army having manifested its wishes respecting the restoration of Napoleon, and the rejection of Louis XVIII. from the throne of our ancient kings, *the nation*, essentially obedient and military, will confirm the wish of the army.

object of his obloquy, by whom he permitted himself to be branded as a traitor, and then striking a balance between mutual crimination, openly withdrew his allegiance from Louis, and restored it to his former master!! The publication of the addresses and adhesions of the last year, would furnish an endless commentary on this subject. Individuals may be false and perfidious, but what shall we think of the moral feeling of an empire, where every city, town and village, vied in the intense-ness of their gratulations to the king, upon his return, and upon their escape from the tyranny which had just passed away, whose addresses were not couched in mere technical official language, as an unwilling test of forced allegiance, but poured forth in the tone of unaffected sincerity—and yet, where no hand has been lifted up, to sustain their professions? *Their intentions, however, can only be suspended,* the presence of foreign, will light the torch of civil war, in that country. The best interests of the great mass of its population are engaged on the side of a pacific

system, which never can be *permanent* under the domination of Buonaparte.

It has been alledged, that the French nation are now about to support a sovereign of their own choice. Where is the proof of this assertion? Have we heard of rejoicings, congratulations, and counter-adhesions, to neutralize the hundreds of folio pages in the *Moniteur* of last year, which are filled with them. Until such documents begin to appear, the substantial argument is all on the side of those who contend, *that the mass of the French nation is adverse to the return of Buonaparte*. Even if it was allowed, that the presence of the allies was the remote cause of the recal of the Bourbons, the proximate cause was the difficulty in which France found herself placed by the ambition of her Ruler; from which difficulty it was impossible to escape (as Ney expresses, in his letter to Talleyrand), except by the adoption of the ancient dynasty. France recalled the House of Bourbon *for her own special benefit*, as the only means to diss-

pate the storm of war and desolation, which was gathering around her.

The Bourbons reascended the throne, and one burst of joy resounded throughout the country. The army alone remained cold and silent,

“Nec magis incepto voltum sermone movetur,
“Quam si dura silex, aut stet Marpesia cautes.”

and meditated deep, though tardy vengeance. *They* have had their triumph, but will the powers of Europe submit to the doctrine, that the French army, having chosen to restore Napoleon, have a right to call upon the nation, as essentially obedient and military, to confirm their act—for such is the literal state of the case. Will they admit a precedent, which is only justified by the prætorian bands of old, or janissaries of modern times?

The late temporary deliverance of Europe was effected by engaging the feelings of the people on the side of the allies. The cause was just, the purpose noble, the

operations well combined. That moral effect, derived from presumed invincibility, which had given such fatal energy to the armies of France, was transferred to their opponents; it was then discovered, that mere military skill, unaided by the agency of corruption, disunion, and overweening confidence, could avail little against proportionate opposition, that kingdoms were not lost and won by the varied combination of masses, but by the “unconquerable soul” which stimulated armies to victory. The lesson which the campaign of 1813-14 read to Europe can never be forgotten. There is no sort of analogy between the war at the commencement of the Revolution, and that which the present year may produce; the one was directed against a whole nation, whose frantic career was endangering the very basis of civil society, but at the same time struggling for theoretical rights of liberty and equality, in which the interests of all *were supposed* to be involved, the other would be a sacred league against the *principles of military despotism*, where the happiness of all is sacrificed for the

gain of a few. I trust, therefore, that the allies will proclaim their determination to revive the second article of the treaty of Chaumont, “ never to lay down their
 “ arms until the object of the war, mu-
 “ tually understood and agreed upon, shall
 “ have been attained, viz. to put an end
 “ to the miseries of Europe by perma-
 “ nently establishing a just balance of
 “ power.” This object is palpably unattainable, as long as Buonaparte, having violated a solemn treaty, signed by himself, and regained the throne by a military insurrection, shall be permitted to direct the energies of France.

After such a proclamation, the principle of the war is at once made simple, its policy unimpeachable, its success certain, its object to remedy the errors of the past, and to confirm the sacred pledge offered in the face of heaven to secure the liberties of mankind.

But if one of the main links of this chain are broken, by which the hopes of Eu-

ropean independence are still suspended ; if any one of the four great powers shall secede from the contest, or lend a cold and feeble assistance ; if singleness of purpose, and enthusiasm of effort is not to mark the short, but awful moment, then *the policy of war may become doubtful*, and we must be content, “ by partial truces, by
 “ concession following concession, to purchase from our insatiable enemy, a precarious quiet, a troubled sleep, furnishing to him the very means of his aggression, and of our own subjugation.”

Such are my sentiments ; I have some reason to think, that they are not essentially different from those of your Lordship. I shall be happy to find my expectations confirmed.

I have the honour to remain,

&c. &c. &c.

POSTSCRIPT

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

POSTSCRIPT.

April 22, 1815.

THE lapse of time (however inevitable) that has already occurred, without offensive movements on the part of the allies, has been highly favourable to the cause of Buonaparte; it has crushed the demonstrations of loyalty in the south, where the vigour of the hand has not corresponded to the sentiments of the heart. It has enabled him to circulate statements and Exposés,* which, though utterly inconsistent, and contradictory to the letter and spirit of his

* To suppose that these abstract speculations of Carnot, Caulaincourt, and Co. under the permission of Buonaparte, are really proofs of a vital and permanent change of *his* system, would be as absurd as to contend that a pious and moral sermon was decisive of the character of a profligate preacher. They are proofs of his present weakness in being compelled to chew the cud of Republicanism to satisfy the self-created leaders of that party, and to gain a new hold on public opinion; but the stage-trick is too glaring, even to deceive a *French audience*.

Lyons address, are, in the highest degree, ingenious and plausible, and resemble their multiplied precedents in former Moniteurs, which remain as monuments of insincere professions to lull the people into tolerance and inaction. If the twenty-five millions of inhabitants, of which France proper is *said to be* composed, are *really devoted* to Buónaparte, I should be the first to express my conviction of *the impossibility of conquering them*; nor would the experiment be justifiable, even if it were feasible, were he to offer such practical securities for the guarantee of the Peace of Paris, as would be deemed a fair counter-balance to that perfidy which may now be said to belong historically to his character; but, upon the present evidence, I cannot but remain *completely sceptical* as to this vaunted unanimity of French sentiment towards him, even though they may resemble the Jews,

“ Who, banish’d David did from Hebron bring,
 “ And, with a general shout, proclaim’d him king :
 “ Those very Jews, who, at their very best,
 “ Their humour, more than loyalty, exprest,

“ Now wonder’d why so long they had obey’d
 “ An idol monarch, which their hands had made.”

I must still believe that the nation is not prepared to re-kindle the flame of quenched enthusiasm, and to revive the spirit of the Revolution in the cause of Buonaparte.

It has been well remarked, “ that short
 “ and dogmatical explanations of great
 “ events are at once agreeable to the
 “ pride of intellect, and suitable to the
 “ narrow capacity and indolent minds of
 “ ordinary men :” and the converse of this general proposition is equally true, that a long and detailed analysis of the variety of causes of great events is at once agreeable to the poverty of intellect, and serves to supply the absence of general principles by a concourse of multifarious details. A lock may appear to have great intricacy of structure, and to require a key with an infinite variety of wards, and of complex construction, to open it, but a pick-lock, of the most simple form, passes by all the unnecessary apparatus, and, fixing upon *the real point* of resistance, accom-

plishes its purpose with perfect facility. It has been argued, that the limitation of territory, and the recession of France from her pretended natural limits, has been one of the principal causes of the apathy which has been shewn to the House of Bourbon; but would it have been expedient to have permitted her to retain Belgium, or a section of Italy, for the sake of preserving her wounded vanity from annoyance; to invest her with physical force for the purpose of economizing her moral irritability? but, above all, is not this argument most inconsistent from the lips of those who contend that *circumstances and position will compel Buonaparte to abide by the peace of Paris?* What security does this mock alliance with the republicans afford to the world? What? this boasted constitution which the month of May is to invite from its pigeon hole? a worthy subject of rejoicing to the friends of liberty! as if it was a novel experiment, instead of a stale expedient, in a country saturated with every variety and modification of government, which she has precipitated in succession.

Is the Constituent Assembly forgotten? the Legislative Assembly? the Republic one and indivisible? the Dictatorships of Marat and of Robespierre? the insurrection of the Jacobins? the insurrection of the 13th Vendemaire, the end of the Convention? the Directory of Five, and the Two Councils? the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor in favour of the Directory against the Two Councils? the Revolution of November 1799, and the election of Buonaparte as head of the Triple Consulate? the abolition of the Triple Consulate, and the election of Buonaparte as Consul for life? his subsequent elevation to the imperial dignity; and, finally, the Bourbon Revolution, and complete reorganization of the government? Are all these changes forgotten?

Has not France been free? and did she retain her freedom?

“ In vain might liberty invoke

“ The spirit to its bondage broke,

“ And ease the neck that courts the yoke.”

Who has more judiciously commented

upon her abortive pretensions to a free government than her present ruler? who has more mathematically demonstrated that it is fruitless to build a superstructure of freedom upon a basis of ignorance, impulse, and frivolity? He has most correctly pointed out in those conversations, which were some relief to his bursting mind in the moments of "his exile," the distinctions between the character of the people of England and France, which make liberty, as it were, indigenous in the one, and exotic in the other country. The long transmission of feelings of liberty through succeeding generations, which, like physical qualities, are strictly hereditary, as contrasted with habits of servility and dependence, reproduced through an equal period—a graduated scale of ranks, from the peasant to the monarch, each partially incorporated with its preceding and succeeding class, and thus circulating through the whole a practical sentiment of tempered freedom—as compared with a vast assemblage of individuals collected together in the same area, visited by the same return of sea-

sons, and partaking of the same customs and habits of living, but connected by no tie except mutual vanity ; breathing no common sentiment, except hatred of England ; professing no fixed opinions, but of their own infallibility ; yielding to successive and contrasted impulses, forming to themselves models in the schools of wild and speculative theory, and not of sober and rational practice. A collection of individuals, but not a nation. It is not enough to plant the tree of liberty—the more arduous process, and which requires time, is the preparation of the soil in which alone it can flourish. At any moment, the French, collectively or individually, would barter liberty for the indulgence of national vanity.

The injustice of the Congress has been quoted as a main exciting cause of the favourable reception of Buonaparte, although at the same time it is allowed, that its results were unknown. Even if they had been known, I cannot believe that France would so far forsake her habitual

selfishness as to feel the slightest regret at any arrangement from which she derived no special inconvenience ; and, on the other hand, if the acts of Congress were calculated to form an effective balance of power, her exasperation would be in proportion to their merit and efficiency.

It was a fatal error to hesitate to guarantee the crown of Naples to Murat ; policy, and even justice should have dictated such a measure as one of primary necessity. Its principle should have been to mark the distinction between power used, on the one hand, for the benefit of the people, and abused on the other for the personal gratification of the monarch. When the allies refused to treat with Buonaparte, the refusal had no retrospect to his want of hereditary right, or to his former state as an obscure individual ; they had recognised his authority, and that acknowledgment was a valid and permanent title ; but it referred to his boundless and impracticable ambition, to his unexampled perfidy, and to that baneful assumption of supre-

inacy in the commonwealth of Europe, which in itself was an infraction of the compact, to which as Monarch he was bound to subscribe—they only confirmed that dethronement, which his actions had already incurred. The recognition of Murat would have furnished the best commentary upon the justness of their principle. But the time is past, and Murat marches to claim those rights by the sword, which were refused by the pen.

It is contended, that as the 'Treaty of Fontainbleau was not kept by the contracting powers, that Buonaparte was released from obligation on his part; but may it not be presumed, that his solemn act of abdication was a separate and exclusive act, in no degree dependant upon the 'Treaty of Fontainbleau, though its provisions were then repeated, and that his independent sovereignty *for life* was only co-existent with the performance of the terms therein contained?

'The powers of Europe are justly blamed

by many persons for having placed the slightest confidence in him, and for not having watched him in his retreat ; but how can the same persons assert, that he was an independent sovereign, who, by the spirit of their proposition, ought not to have been watched, and who now pronounce that his protestations of adherence to the Treaty of Paris are strictly to be depended upon? It is pretended, that had his pension been paid, he would have hesitated to escape, and that no prospective concert could have existed between himself and the Marshals at the period of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, *because* he had expressed an anxiety to come to this country: that acknowledged fact appears to confirm the truth of the supposition ; he knew that his proposal of coming to England *would not be accepted*, though it might deceive the powers of Europe as a proof of his unqualified abandonment of all ideas of return.

It is incorrect to assert, that the constitution of the year 1814 was framed by

Buonaparte's senate, when surrounded by Russian bayonets, in opposition to the will of the people. 'The Bourbon revolution not only had the appearance, but the reality of an unanimous national act with reference to *the civil part of the population*.

It was great impolicy on the part of the Bourbons not to repeat, and repeat again, their solemnly-expressed détermination to confirm the title of the "Acquereurs des biens nationaux;" but, though reports, which would alarm and shake public confidence to its base, were circulated by the emissaries of Buonaparte of their insincerity upon this point, it is impossible to believe that they had the slightest foundation. If the French nation can only look to security for their property, privileges, and prejudices to a government arising, like these objects, out of the Revolution; and, if the new Bourbon government, though manifestly less despotic than that of Buonaparte, was insufficient to satisfy them, which government (though Louis antedated his reign) may be said, in point of fact, to have emanated precisely as

much as his own from the results of the Revolution* — what chances are there of the republican principle ultimately predominating in this embryo constitution, which principle is hailed as a test of its pacific character?

It has been most ably remarked, “that frequent changes in Government, however arising, promote a disposition to acquiesce in change. They are incompatible with enthusiasm: the people are mere spectators of revolutions, instead of being actors in them; and they are bloodless, not from the humanity, but from the indifference of the people.”

The spirit of this reasoning appears to me most just, and to warrant the expectation, that no exertions will be made in

* The series may thus be traced—Free government, unmixed democracy, oligarchy, anarchy—Military tyranny terminating in insurrection at home, and in conquest from abroad, and then a recurrence to the old family as the only means of preserving the nation.

France in the cause of Buonaparte. But if this reasoning, though grounded upon a correct appreciation of human nature in general, is vitiated *by that extent of French caprice and inconstancy, which baffles all moral estimate*, the allies will give peace to France with more effect with an army of six hundred thousand men within her territory, than in a more pacific attitude. Whatever errors of policy may have been committed by the Bourbons, it is a fair and manly concession on the part of an advocate for peace with Buonaparte, under any circumstances, to allow “that more
 “civil liberty has been enjoyed in France,
 “during these ten months, than in any
 “period of French History.” It is not difficult to enumerate “*a priori*,” the various causes of impatience which different parties and sects of France might be presumed to feel against the House of Bourbon, and it is undeniable, that their government was one of orthodoxy and prescription, while that of Buonaparte has been, and ever will be, one of energy and moral effect, suited to theameleon

shades of public opinion ; but if we refer them to that standard by which all governments should be measured, the maintenance and augmentation of human happiness upon principles of private and public morality, of regulated, but practical liberty, and their reflected effects upon the civilized world, no person will be found to hazard a comparison. In the one, the hope of Europe was centered ; in the other, the despair. That material and extensive change was in progress, on which alone the safety of the Bourbon dynasty depended ; the gradual transmutation of the soldier into the citizen, the combination of elements hitherto irreconcilable since the Revolution ; this has been even less practicable in the higher than in the lower classes ; it is easy to change the sword into the reaping hook, but a fruitless task to attempt to convert a military despot into a patriot and philosopher.

It was the palpable policy of the allies not to have alluded in any proclamation directly to the Bourbons. To preserve an

inviolable silence with respect to them, was to give a bonus to popular feeling in France on their return. The restoration of Louis XVIII. to *power*, for he must be considered as yet virtually the King of France, may be the happy result, but cannot be the legitimate object of war. The allies ought to consider that he has been driven suddenly from his throne by a military insurrection, and that exclusive of views of justice, honour, and policy, as relating to themselves, they are invited on principles of humanity to defend the integrity of civil government in France from the tyranny of military usurpation, and such a declaration of principle would, in my humble opinion, have been preferable to the one promulgated in the treaty of the 25th ult.

In a word, the question of war resolves itself into a *question of means*, which question involves the *power of attack*, and the *probability of resistance*; its justice and policy are evident, if the means shall be found adequate to justify the attempt—a

short period will determine whether we are to slumber in our armour, with the beacons trimmed, or to resume a state of tranquil and confident repose.

APPENDIX.

(A)

Déclaration des Puissances Alliés.

Châtillon-sur-Seine, 16 mars 1814.

Les puissances alliées se doivent à elles-mêmes, à leurs peuples et à la France, d'annoncer publiquement dans le moment de la rupture des conférences de Châtillon les motifs qui les ont portées à entamer une négociation avec le gouvernement français, et les causes de la rupture de cette négociation.

Des événemens militaires, tels que l'histoire aura peine à en recueillir dans d'autres temps, renversèrent, au mois d'octobre dernier, l'édifice monstrueux compris sous la dénomination d'Empire français, édifice politique fondé sur les ruines d'états jadis indépendans et heureux, agrandi par des provinces arrachées à d'antiques monarchies, soutenu au prix du sang, de la fortune et du bien-être d'une génération entière. Conduits sur le Rhin par la victoire, les souverains alliés crurent devoir exposer de nouveau à l'Europe les principes qui forment la base de leur alliance, leurs vœux et leur détermination. Eloignés de toute vue d'ambition et de conquête, animés du seul désir de voir l'Europe reconstruite sur une juste échelle de proportion entre les puissances, décidés à ne point poser les armes

avant d'avoir atteint le noble but de leurs efforts, ils manifestèrent la constance de leurs intentions par un acte public, et ils n'hésitèrent pas à s'expliquer vis-à-vis du gouvernement ennemi dans un sens conforme à leur immuable résolution. Le gouvernement français se prévalut des explications franches des cours alliées pour témoigner des dispositions pacifiques. Il avoit besoin sans doute d'en emprunter les apparences pour justifier aux yeux de ses peuples les nouveaux efforts qu'il ne cessoit de leur demander. Tout cependant prouvoit aux cabinets alliés qu'il ne vouloit que tirer parti d'une négociation apparente, dans l'intention de disposer l'opinion publique en sa faveur, et que la *paix de l'Europe* étoit loin encore de sa pensée.

Les puissances, pénétrant ses vues secrètes, se décidèrent à aller conquérir en France même cette paix tant désirée. Des armées nombreuses passèrent le Rhin ; à peine eurent-elles franchi les premières barrières, que le ministre des relations extérieures de la France se présenta aux avant-postes.

Toutes les démarches du gouvernement français n'eurent dès-lors plus d'autre but que de donner le change à l'opinion, de fasciner les yeux du peuple français, et de chercher à rejeter sur les alliés l'odieux des malheurs inséparables d'une guerre d'invasion.

La marche des événements avoit donné à cette époque aux cours alliées le sentiment de toute la force de la ligue européenne. Les principes qui présidoient aux conseils des souverains dès leur première réunion pour le salut commun avoient reçu tout leur développement ; rien n'empêchoit plus qu'ils n'exprimassent les conditions nécessaires à la reconstruction de l'édifice social : ces conditions ne devoient plus, à la suite de tant de victoires, former un

obstacle à la paix. La seule puissance appelée à placer dans la balance des compensations pour la France, l'Angleterre, pouvoit énoncer avec détail les sacrifices qu'elle étoit prête à porter à la pacification générale. Les souverains alliés pouvoient espérer enfin que l'expérience des derniers temps auroit influé sur un conquérant en butte aux reproches d'une grande nation, et témoin pour la première fois, dans sa capitale même, des maux qu'il a attirés sur la France. Cette expérience pouvoit l'avoir conduit au sentiment que la conservation des trônes se lie essentiellement à la modération et à la justice. Toutefois les souverains alliés, convaincus que l'essai qu'ils feroient ne devoit pas compromettre la marche des opérations militaires, convinrent que ses opérations continueroient pendant la négociation : l'histoire du passé et de funestes souvenirs leur avoient démontré la nécessité de cette démarche. Leurs plénipotentiaires se réunirent avec celui du gouvernement français.

Bientôt les armées victorieuses s'avancèrent jusqu'aux portes de la capitale. Le gouvernement ne songea dans ce moment qu'à la sauver d'une occupation ennemie. Le plénipotentiaire de France reçut l'ordre de proposer un armistice fondé sur des bases conformes à celles que les cours alliées jugeoient elles-mêmes nécessaires au rétablissement de la paix générale. Il offrit la remise immédiate des places fortes dans les pays que la France céderoit, le tout à la condition d'une suspension des opérations militaires.

Les cours alliées, convaincues par vingt années d'expérience que, dans les négociations avec le cabinet français, les apparences doivent être soigneusement distinguées des intentions, substituèrent à cette proposition celle de signer

sur-le-champ les préliminaires de la paix. Cette signature avoit pour la France tous les avantages d'un armistice, sans entrainer pour les alliés les dangers d'une suspension d'armes. Quelques succès partiels venoient cependant de marquer les premiers pas d'une armée, formée, sous les murs de Paris, de l'élite de la génération actuelle, dernière espérance de la nation et des débris d'un million de braves qui avoient péri sur les champs de bataille, ou qui avoient été abandonnés sur les grandes routes, depuis Lisbonne jusqu'à Moscou, sacrifiés à des intérêts étrangers à la France. Aussitôt les conférences de Châtillon changèrent de caractère : le plénipotentiaire français demeura sans instruction, et fut hors d'état de répondre aux propositions des cours alliées. Elles chargèrent leurs plénipotentiaires de remettre un projet de traité préliminaire, renfermant toutes les bases qu'elles jugeoient nécessaires pour le rétablissement de l'équilibre politique, et qui, peu de jours avant, avoient été offertes par le gouvernement français lui-même, dans un moment où il croyoit sans doute son existence compromise. Les principes de la reconstruction de l'Europe se trouvoient établis dans ce projet.

La France, rendue aux dimensions que des siècles de gloire et de prospérité, sous la domination de ses rois, lui avoient assurées, devoit partager avec l'Europe les bienfaits de sa liberté, de l'indépendance nationale et de la paix. Il ne dépendoit que de son gouvernement de mettre, par un seul mot, un terme aux souffrances de la nation, de lui rendre, avec la paix, ses colonies, son commerce, et le libre exercice de son industrie. Vouloit-il plus ? Les puissances s'étoient offertes à discuter, dans un esprit de conciliation, ses vœux sur des objets de possession d'une

mutuelle convenance qui dépasseroient les limites de la France avant les guerres de la révolution.

Quinze jours se passèrent sans réponse de la part du gouvernement français. Les plénipotentiaires alliés insistèrent sur un terme péremptoire pour l'acceptation ou le refus des conditions de paix. On laissa au plénipotentiaire français la latitude de présenter un contre-projet pourvu que ce contre-projet répondît à l'esprit et à la substance des conditions proposées par les cours alliées. Le terme du 10 mars fut fixé d'un commun accord. Le plénipotentiaire français ne produisit, à l'échéance du terme, que des pièces dont la discussion, loin de rapprocher du but, n'ont fait que prolonger de stériles négociations. Un nouveau terme de peu de jours fut accordé à la demande du plénipotentiaire de France. Le 15 mars enfin ce plénipotentiaire remit un contre-projet qui ne laissa plus de doute que les malheurs de la France n'avoient pas encore changé les vues de son gouvernement. Revenant, alors sur ce qu'il avoit proposé lui-même, le gouvernement français demanda dans un nouveau projet que des peuples étrangers à l'esprit français, des peuples que dans des siècles de domination ne foudroient pas dans la nation française, doivent continuer à en faire partie.

La France devoit conserver des dimensions incompatibles avec l'établissement d'un système d'équilibre et hors de proportion avec les autres grands corps politiques en Europe ; elle devoit garder les positions et les points offensifs au moyen desquels son gouvernement avoit, pour le malheur de l'Europe et de la France, amené la chute de tant de trônes, et opéré tant de bouleversemens ; *des membres de la famille régnante de France devoient être replacés sur des trônes étrangers ; le gouvernement français enfin,*

ce gouvernement qui depuis tant d'années n'a pas moins cherché à régner sur l'Europe par la discorde que par la force des armes, devoit rester l'arbitre des rapports intérieurs et du sort des puissances de l'Europe.

Les cours alliées, en continuant la négociation sous de tels auspices, eussent manqué à tout ce qu'elles se doivent à elles-mêmes ; elles eussent dès ce moment renoncé au but glorieux qu'elles se proposent ; leurs efforts n'eussent plus tourné que contre leurs peuples. En signant un traité sur les bases du contre-projet français, les puissances eussent déposé les armes entre les mains de l'ennemi commun ; elles eussent trompé l'attente des nations et la confiance de leurs alliés.

C'est dans un moment aussi décisif pour le salut du monde que les souverains alliés renouvellent l'engagement solennel qu'ils ne poseront pas les armes avant d'avoir atteint le grand objet de leur alliance. La France ne peut s'en prendre qu'à son gouvernement des maux qu'elle souffre. La paix seule pourra fermer les plaies qu'un esprit de domination universelle et sans exemple dans les annales du monde lui a portées. *Cette paix sera celle de l'Europe* ; toute autre est inadmissible. Il est temps enfin que les princes puissent, sans influence étrangère, veiller au bien-être de leurs peuples ; que les nations respectent leur indépendance réciproque ; que les institutions sociales soient à l'abri de bouleversemens journaliers, les propriétés assurées et le commerce libre.

L'Europe entière ne forme qu'un vœu, celui de faire participer à ces bienfaits de la paix la France, dont les puissances alliées elles-mêmes ne désirent, ne veulent et ne souffriront pas le démembrement. La foi de leurs promesses est dans les principes pour lesquels elles combat-

tent. Mais par où les souverains pourront-ils juger que la France veut les partager, ces principes qui doivent fonder le bonheur du monde aussi long-temps qu'ils verroient que la même ambition qui a répandu tant de maux sur l'Europe, est encore le seul mobile du gouvernement ; que, prodigue du sang français, et le versant à flots, l'intérêt public est toujours immolé à l'intérêt personnel ? Sous de tels rapports, où seroit la garantie de l'avenir, si un système aussi destructeur ne trouvoit pas un terme dans la volonté générale de la nation ? Dès-lors la paix de l'Europe est assurée, et rien ne sauroit la troubler à l'avenir.

(A A)

Déclaration.

Paris, 31 mars 1814, 3 heures après midi.

Les armées des puissances alliées ont occupé la capitale de la France. Les souverains alliés accueillent le vœu de la nation française.

Ils déclarent :

Que si les conditions de la paix devoient renfermer de plus fortes garanties lorsqu'il s'agissoit d'enchaîner l'ambition de Bonaparte, elles doivent être plus favorables, lorsque, par un retour vers un gouvernement sage, le France elle-même offrira l'assurance de ce repos.

Les souverains alliés proclament en conséquence,

Qu'ils ne traiteront plus avec Napoléon Bonaparte, ni avec aucun de sa famille ;

Qu'ils respectent l'intégrité de l'ancienne France, telle qu'elle a existé sous ses rois légitimes ; ils peuvent même

faire plus, parce qu'ils professent toujours le principe que, pour le bonheur de l'Europe, il faut que la France soit grande et forte ;

Qu'ils reconnoîtront et garantiront la constitution que la nation française se donnera. Ils invitent par conséquent le sénat à désigner un gouvernement provisoire qui puisse pourvoir aux besoins de l'administration et préparer la constitution qui conviendra au peuple français.

Les intentions que je viens d'exprimer me sont communes avec toutes les puissances alliées.

ALEXANDRE.

Par S. M. I. les ecrétaire d'état comte

DE NESSELRODE.



(B)

Proclamation du Conseil général du département de la Seine, Conseil municipal de Paris.

HABITANS DE PARIS,

Vos magistrats seroient traîtres envers vous et la patrie, si, par de viles considérations personnelles, ils comprimoient plus long-temps la voix de leur conscience.

Elle leur crie que vous devez tous les maux qui vous accablent à un seul homme.

C'est lui qui, chaque année, par la conscription, décime nos familles. Qui de nous n'a perdu un fils, un frère, des parens, des amis ? Pour qui tous ces braves sont-ils morts ? Pour lui seul et non pour le pays. Pour quelle cause ? Ils ont été immolés, uniquement immolés à la démence

de laisser après lui le souvenir du plus épouvantable oppresseur qui ait pesé sur l'espèce humaine.

C'est lui qui, au lieu de quatre cent millions que la France payoit sous nos bons et anciens rois pour être libre, heureuse et tranquille, nous a surchargés de plus de *quinze cent millions* d'impôts, auxquels il menaçoit d'ajouter encore.

C'est lui qui nous a fermé les mers des deux Mondes ; qui a tari toutes les sources de l'industrie nationale ; arraché à nos champs les cultivateurs, les ouvriers à nos manufactures.

A lui nous devons la haine de tous les peuples, sans l'avoir méritée, puisque, comme eux, nous fûmes les malheureuses victimes, bien plus que les tristes instrumens de sa rage.

N'est-ce pas lui aussi qui, violant ce que les hommes ont de plus sacré, a retenu captif le vénérable chef de la religion ; a privé de ses états, par une détestable perfidie, un roi son allié, et livré à la dévastation la nation espagnole, notre antique et toujours fidèle amie ?

N'est-ce pas lui encore qui, ennemi de ses propres sujets long-temps trompés par lui, après avoir tout à l'heure refusé une paix honorable dans laquelle notre malheureux pays du moins eût pu respirer, a fini par donner l'ordre paricide d'exposer inutilement la garde nationale pour la défense impossible de la capitale, sur laquelle il appeloit ainsi toutes les vengeances de l'ennemi ?

N'est-ce pas lui enfin qui, redoutant par-dessus tout la vérité, a chassé outrageusement, à la face de l'Europe, nos législateurs, parce qu'une fois ils ont tenté de la lui dire avec autant de ménagement que de dignité.

Qu'importe qu'il n'ait sacrifié qu'un petit nombre de

personnes à ses haines ou bien à ses vengeances particulières, s'il a sacrifié la France, que disons-nous la France ? toute l'Europe à son ambition sans mesure ?

Ambition ou vengeance, la cause n'est rien. Quelle que soit cette cause, voyez l'effet ; voyez ce vaste continent de l'Europe partout convert des ossemens confondus de Français et de peuples qui n'avoient rien à se demander les uns aux autres, qui ne se laissoient pas que les distances affranchissoient des querelles, et qu'il n'a précipités dans la guerre que pour remplir la terre du bruit de son nom.

Que nous parle-t-on de ses victoires passées ? Quel bien nous ont-elles fait ces funestes victoires ? La haine des peuples, les larmes de nos familles, le célibat forcé de nos filles, la ruine de toutes les fortunes, le veuvage prématuré de nos femmes, le désespoir des pères et des mères à qui, d'une malheureuse postérité, il ne reste plus la main d'un enfant pour leur fermer les yeux ; voilà ce que nous ont produit ses victoires ! Ce sont elles qui amènent aujourd'hui, jusque dans nos murs toujours restés vierges sous la paternelle administration de nos rois, les étrangers dont la généreuse protection nous commande la reconnaissance, lorsqu'il nous eût été si doux de leur offrir une alliance désintéressé.

Il n'est pas un d'entre nous qui, dans le secret de son cœur, ne le déteste comme un ennemi public ; pas un qui, dans ses plus intimes communications, n'ait formé le vœu de voir arriver un terme à tant d'inutiles cruautés.

Ce vœu de nos cœurs et des vôtres, nous serions des déserteurs de la cause publique si nous tardions à l'exprimer.

L'Europe en armes nous la demande. Elle l'implore

comme un bienfait envers l'humanité, comme le garant d'une paix universelle et durable.

Parisiens, *l'Europe en armes* ne l'obtiendrait pas de vos magistrats, s'il n'étoit pas conforme à leurs devoirs.

Mais c'est au nom de ces devoirs mêmes et des plus sacrés de tous que nous abjurons toute obéissance envers l'usurpateur pour retourner à nos maîtres légitimes.

S'il y a des périls à suivre ce mouvement du cœur et de la conscience, nous les acceptons. L'histoire et la reconnaissance des Français recueilleront nôtres noms. Elles les lègueront à l'estime de la postérité.

En conséquence,

Le conseil général du département de la Seine, conseil municipal de Paris spontanément réuni,

Déclare, à l'unanimité de ses membres présents,

Qu'il renonce formellement à toute obéissance envers Napoléon Bonaparte ;

Exprime le vœu le plus ardent pour que le gouvernement monarchique soit rétabli dans la personne de Louis XVIII. et de ses successeurs légitimes ;

Arrête que la présente déclaration et la proclamation qui l'explique seront imprimées, distribuées et affichées à Paris, notifiées à toutes autorités restées à Paris et dans le département, et envoyées à tous les conseils généraux de département.

Fait en conseil général à Paris, en l'hôtel-de-ville, le 1^{er} avril.

Signé BADENIER, BELLARD, BARTHELEMY,
BONHOMET, BOSCHERON, DELAITRE, GAU-
TRIER, d'HARCOURT, DE LAMOIGNON, LE-
BEAU, *président* ; MONTAMANT, *secrétaire* ;
PERIGNON, VIAL.

Extrait de la séance du 3 avril 1814.

Le sénat conservateur,

Considérant que dans une monarchie constitutionnelle le monarque n'existe qu'en vertu de la constitution ou du pacte social ;

Que Napoléon Bonaparte, pendant quelque temps d'un gouvernement ferme et prudent, avoit donné à la nation des sujets de compter pour l'avenir sur des actes de sagesse et de justice ; mais qu'ensuite il a déchiré le pacte qui l'unissoit au peuple français, notamment en levant des impôts, en établissant des taxes autrement qu'en vertu de la loi, contre la teneur expresse du serment qu'il avoit prêté à son avènement au trône, conformément à l'art. 53 de l'acte des constitutions du 28 floréal an 12 ;

Qu'il a commis cet attentat aux droits du peuple lors même qu'il venoit d'ajourner, sans nécessité, le corps législatif, et de faire supprimer comme criminel un rapport, de ce corps, auquel il contestoit son titre et sa part à la représentation nationale ;

Qu'il a entrepris une suite de guerres, en violation de l'art. 50 de l'acte des constitutions du 22 frimaire an 8, qui veut que la déclaration de guerre soit proposée, discutée décrétée et promulguée comme des lois ;

Qu'il a inconstitutionnellement rendu plusieurs décrets portant peine de mort, notamment les deux décrets du 5 mars dernier, tendant à faire considérer comme nationale une guerre qui n'avoit lieu que dans l'intérêt de son ambition démesurée ;

Qu'il a violé les lois constitutionnelles par ses décrets sur les prisons d'état ;

Qu'il a anéanti la responsabilité des ministres, confondu tous les pouvoirs et détruit l'indépendance des corps judiciaires ;

Considérant que la liberté de la presse, établie et consacrée comme l'un des droits de la nation, a été constamment soumise à la censure arbitraire de sa police, et qu'en même temps il s'est toujours servi de la presse pour remplir la France et l'Europe de faits controuvés, de maximes fausses, de doctrines favorables au despotisme, et d'outrages contre les gouvernemens étrangers ;

Que des actes et rapports entendus par le sénat ont subi des altérations dans la publication qui en a été faite ;

Considérant qu'au lieu de régner dans la seule vue de l'intérêt, du bonheur et de la gloire du peuple français, aux termes de son serment, Napoléon a mis le comble aux malheurs de la patrie par son refus de traiter à des conditions que l'intérêt national obligeoit d'accepter, et qui ne compromettoient pas l'honneur français ;

Par l'abus qu'il a fait de tous les moyens qu'on lui a confiés en hommes et en argent ;

Par l'abandon des blessés sans pansements, sans secours, sans subsistances ;

Par différentes mesures dont les suites étoient la ruine des villes, la dépopulation des campagnes, la famine et les maladies contagieuses ;

Considérant que par toutes ces causes le gouvernement impérial établi par le sénatus-consulte du 28 floréal an 12 a cessé d'exister, et que le vœu manifeste de tous les Français appelle un ordre de choses dont le premier résultat soit le rétablissement de la paix générale, et qui soit aussi l'époque d'une réconciliation solennelle entre tous les états de la grande famille européenne ;

Le sénat déclare et décrète ce qui suit :

Art. 1er. Napoléon Bonaparte est déchu du trône, et le droit d'hérédité établi dans sa famille est aboli.

2. Le peuple français et l'armée sont déliés du serment de fidélité envers Napoléon Bonaparte.

3. Le présent décret sera transmis par un message au gouvernement provisoire de la France, envoyé de suite à tous les départemens et aux armées, et proclamé incessamment dans tous les quartiers de la capitale.

Aucun autre objet ne se trouvant à l'ordre du jour, M. le président lève la séance.

Les président et secrétaires,

BARTHELEMY.

Comte de VALENCE, PASSORET.



(D)

Adresse aux Armées françaises.

SOLDATS,

La France vient de briser le joug sous lequel elle gémit avec vous depuis tant d'années.

Vous n'avez jamais combattu que pour la patrie ; vous ne pouvez plus combattre que contre elle sous les drapeaux de l'homme qui vous conduit.

Voyez ce que vous avez souffert de sa tyrannie : vous étiez naguère un million de soldats, presque tous ont péri ; on les a livrés au fer de l'ennemi, sans subsistances, sans hôpitaux ; ils ont été condamnés à périr de misère et de faim.

Soldats, il est temps de finir les maux de la patrie ; la paix est dans vos mains, la refuserez-vous à la France désolée ? Les ennemis mêmes vous la demandent ; ils regrettent de ravager ces belles contrées, et ne veulent s'armer que contre votre oppresseur et le nôtre. Seriez-vous sourds à la voix de la patrie qui vous rappelle et vous supplie ? Elle vous parle par son sénat, par sa capitale, et surtout par ses malheurs ; vous êtes ses plus nobles enfans, et ne pouvez appartenir à celui qui l'a ravagée, qui l'a livrée sans armes, sans défense, qui a voulu rendre votre nom odieux à toutes les nations, et qui auroit peut-être compromis votre gloire, si un homme, qui n'est pas même Français, pouvoit jamais affaiblir l'honneur de nos armes et la générosité de nos soldats.

Vous n'êtes plus les soldats de Napoléon, le sénat et la France entière vous dégagent de vos sermens.

Signé les membres du gouvernement provisoire,
Le Prince de BENEVENT, FRANÇ. DE MONTES-
QUIOU, JAUCOURT, BEURNONVILLE, DALBERG.

Pour copie conforme,
Le secrétaire-adjoint du gouvernement provisoire.

ROUX-LABORIE.

Adresse du Gouvernement provisoire au peuple français.

FRANÇAIS,

Au sortir des discordes civiles, vous avez choisi pour chef un homme qui paroissoit sur la scène du monde avec les caractères de la grandeur. Vous avez mis en lui toutes

vos espérances : ces espérances ont été trompées. Sur les ruines de l'anarchie il n'a fondé que le despotisme.

Il devoit au moins par reconnoissance devenir Français avec vous. Il ne l'a jamais été. Il n'a cessé d'entreprendre, sans but et sans motif, des guerres injustes, en aventurier qui veut être fameux. Il a, dans peu d'années, dévoré vos richesses et votre population.

Chaque famille est en deuil : toute la France gémit : il est sourd à nos maux. Peut-être rêve-t-il encore à ses desseins gigantesques, même quand des revers inouïs punissent avec tant d'éclat l'orgueil et l'abus de la victoire.

Il n'a su régner ni dans l'intérêt national, ni dans l'intérêt même de son despotisme. Il a détruit tout ce qu'il vouloit créer, et récréé tout ce qu'il vouloit détruire. Il ne croyoit qu'à la force, et la force l'accable aujourd'hui, juste retour d'une ambition insensée.

Enfin cette tyrannie sans exemple a cessé : les puissances alliées viennent d'entrer dans la capitale de la France.

Napoléon nous gouvernoit comme un roi de barbares ; Alexandre et ses magnanimes alliés ne parlent que le langage de l'honneur, de la justice et de l'humanité. Ils viennent réconcilier avec l'Europe un peuple brave et malheureux.

Français, le sénat a déclaré *Napoléon déchu du trône* ; la patrie n'est plus avec lui ; un autre ordre de choses peut seul la sauver. Nous avons connu les excès de la licence populaire et ceux du pouvoir absolu ; rétablissons la véritable monarchie, en limitant, par de sages lois, les divers pouvoirs qui la composent.

Qu'à l'abri d'un trône paternel l'agriculture épuisée refleurisse ; que le commerce, chargé d'entraves, reprenne

sa liberté ; que la jeunesse ne soit plus moissonnée par les armes avant d'avoir la force de les porter ; que l'ordre de la nature ne soit plus interrompu, et que le vieillard puisse espérer mourir avant ses enfans ! Français, rallions-nous ; les calamités passées vont finir, et la paix va mettre un terme aux bouleversemens de l'Europe. Les augustes alliés en ont donné leur parole. La France se reposera de ses longues agitations, et, mieux éclairée par la double épreuve de l'anarchie et du despotisme, elle trouvera le bonheur dans le retour d'un gouvernement tutélaire.

(E.)

SENAT CONSERVATEUR.

Extrait des registres du Sénat Conservateur du mercredi 6 Avril, 1814.

Le sénat conservateur, délibérant sur le projet de constitution qui lui a été présenté par le gouvernement provisoire, en exécution de l'acte du sénat du 1^{er} de ce mois ;

Après avoir entendu le rapport d'une commission spéciale de sept membres,

Décète ce qui suit :

Art. 1^{er}. Le gouvernement français est monarchique et héréditaire de mâle en mâle par ordre de primogéniture.

2. Le peuple français appelle librement au trône de France LOUIS-STANISLAS-XAVIER DE FRANCE, frère du dernier roi, et après lui les autres membres de la maison de Bourbon, dans l'ordre ancien.

3. La noblesse ancienne reprend ses titres. La nouvelle conserve les siens héréditairement. La legion d'hon-

neur est maintenant avec ses prérogatives. Le roi déterminera la décoration.

4. Le pouvoir exécutif appartient au roi.

5. Le roi, le sénat, le corps législatif concourent à la formation des lois.

Les projets de lois peuvent être également proposés dans le sénat et dans le corps législatif.

Ceux relatifs aux contributions ne peuvent l'être que dans le corps législatif.

Le roi peut inviter également les deux corps à s'occuper des objets qu'il juge convenables.

La sanction du roi est nécessaire pour le complément de la loi.

6. Il y a cent cinquante sénateurs au moins, et deux cents au plus.

Leur dignité est inamovible et héréditaire de mâle en mâle par primogéniture. Ils sont nommés par le roi.

Les sénateurs actuels, à l'exception de ceux qui renonceroient à la qualité de citoyens français, sont maintenus et font partie de ce nombre. La dotation actuelle du sénat et des sénatoreries leur appartient. Les revenus en sont partagés également entre eux, et passent à leurs successeurs. Le cas échéant de la mort d'un sénateur sans postérité masculine directe, sa portion retourne au trésor public. Les sénateurs qui seront nommés à l'avenir ne peuvent avoir part à cette dotation.

7. Les princes de la famille royale et les princes du sang sont de droit membres du sénat.

On ne peut exercer les fonctions de sénateur qu'après avoir atteint l'âge de majorité.

8. Le sénat détermine les cas où la discussion des objets qu'il traite doit être publique ou secrète.

9. Chaque département nommera au corps législatif le même nombre de députés qu'il y envoyoit.

Les députés qui siègeoient au corps législatif lors du dernier ajournement continueront à y siéger jusqu'à leur remplacement. Tous conservent leur traitement.

A l'avenir ils seront choisis immédiatement par les collèges électoraux, lesquels sont conservés, sauf les changemens qui pourroient être faits par une loi à leur organisation.

La durée des fonctions des députés au corps législatif est fixée à cinq années.

Les nouvelles elections auront lieu pour la session de 1816.

10. Le corps législatif s'assemble de droit chaque année le 1^{er} octobre. Le roi peut le convoquer extraordinairement, il peut l'ajourner, il peut aussi le dissoudre ; mais ce dernier cas un autre corps législatif doit être formé, au plus tard dans les trois mois, par les collèges électoraux.

11. Le corps législatif a le droit de discussion. Les séances sont publiques, sauf le cas où il juge à propos de se former en comité général.

12. Le sénat, le corps législatif, les collèges électoraux et les assemblées de canton élisent leur président dans leur sein.

13. Aucun membre du sénat ou du corps législatif ne peut être arrêté sans une autorisation préalable du corps auquel il appartient.

Le jugement d'un membre du sénat ou du corps législatif accusé appartient exclusivement au sénat.

14. Les ministres peuvent être membres, soit du sénat, soit du corps législatif.

15. L'égalité de proportion dans l'impôt est de droit.

Aucun impôt ne peut être établi ni perçu, s'il n'a été librement consenti par le corps législatif et par le sénat. L'impôt foncier ne peut être établi que pour un an. Le budget de l'année suivante et les comptes de l'année précédente sont présentes chaque année au corps législatif et au sénat, à l'ouverture de la session du corps législatif.

16. La loi déterminera le mode et la quotité du recrutement de l'armée.

17. L'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire est garantie. Nul ne peut être distrait de ses juges naturels.

L'institution des jurés est conservée, ainsi que la publicité des débats en matière criminelle.

La peine de la confiscation des biens est abolie.

Le roi a le droit de faire grâce.

18. Les cours et tribunaux ordinaires actuellement existans sont maintenus. Leur nombre ne pourra être diminué ou augmenté qu'en vertu d'une loi. Les juges sont à vie et inamovibles, à l'exception des juges de paix et des juges de commerce. Les commissions et les tribunaux extraordinaires sont supprimés, et ne pourront être rétablis.

19. La cour de cassation, les cours d'appel et les tribunaux de première instance proposent au roi trois candidats pour chaque place de juge vacante dans leur sein. Le roi choisit l'un des trois. Le roi nomme les premiers présidens et le ministère public des cours et des tribunaux.

20. Les militaires en activité, les officiers, soldats en retraite, les veuves et les officiers pensionnés conservent leurs grades, leurs honneurs et leurs pensions.

21. La personne du roi est inviolable et sacrée. Tous les actes du gouvernement sont signés par un ministre. Les

ministres sont responsables de tout ce que ces actes contiendroient d'attentatoire aux lois, à la liberté publique et individuelle, et aux droits des citoyens.

22. La liberté des cultes et des consciences est garantie. Les ministres des cultes sont également traités et protégés.

23. La liberté de la presse est entière, sauf la répression légale des délits qui pourroient résulter de l'abus de cette liberté. Les commissions sénatoriales de la liberté de la presse et de la liberté individuelle sont conservées.

24. La dette publique est garantie.

Les ventes des domaines nationaux sont irrévocablement maintenues.

25. Aucun Français ne peut être recherché pour les opinions ou les votes qu'il a pu émettre.

26. Tout personne a le droit d'adresser des pétitions individuelles à toute autorité constituée.

27. Tous les Français sont également admissibles à tous les emplois civils et militaires.

28. Toutes les lois actuellement existantes restent en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'il y soit légalement dérogé. Le Code des lois civiles sera intitulé : *Code civil de Français*.

29. La présente Constitution sera soumise à l'acceptation du peuple français dans la forme qui sera réglée. Louis Stanoïslas Xavier sera proclamé *roi de Français* aussitôt qu'il aura juré et signé par un acte portant : *J'accepte la Constitution ; je jure de l'observer et de la faire observer.* Ce serment sera réitéré dans la solennité où il recevra le serment de fidélité des Français.

Signé le Prince de BENEVENT, *Président*.

Les comtes DE VALENCE et DE PASTORET, *secret.*,
etc. etc.

(F)

*Copie de la lettre de M. le maréchal Ney,
à S. A. le prince de Bénévent, président
de la commission composant le gouverne-
ment provisoire.*

MONSEIGNEUR,

Je me suis rendu hier à Paris, avec M. le maréchal duc de Tarente et M. le duc de Vicence, comme chargé de pleins pouvoirs pour défendre près de S. M. l'empereur Alexandre les intérêts de la dynastie de l'empereur Napoléon. Un événement imprévu ayant tout-à-coup arrêté les négociations, qui cependant semblaient promettre les plus heureux résultats, je vis dès lors, que, pour éviter à notre chère patrie les maux affreux d'une guerre civile, il ne restait plus aux Français qu'à embrasser entièrement la cause de nos anciens rois ; et c'est, pénétré de ce sentiment, que je me suis rendu ce soir auprès de l'empereur Napoléon pour lui manifester le vœu de la nation.

L'empereur convaincu de la position critique où il a placé la France, et l'impossibilité où il se trouve de la sauver lui même, a paru se résigner et consentir à l'abdication entière et sans aucune restriction ; c'est demain que j'espère qu'il m'en remettra lui-même l'acte formel et authentique ; aussitôt après, j'aurai l'honneur d'aller voir Votre Altesse Sérénissime.

Je suis avec respect,

Monseigneur,

De Votre Altesse Sérénissime,

Le très-obéissant serviteur.

(Signé) Le maréchal NEY.

Fontainebleau, le 5 Avril, 1814, onze heures et demie du soir.

Pour copie conforme,

Le secrétaire du gouvernement provisoire,

DUPONT (de Nemours.)

(G)

Acté d'abdication de l'Empereur Napoléon.

Les puissances alliées ayant proclamé que l'empereur Napoleon étoit le seul obstacle au rétablissement de la paix en Europe, l'empereur Napoleon, fidele à son serment, déclare qu'il renonce, pour lui et ses héritiers, aux trônes de France et d'Italie, et qu'il n'est aucun sacrifice personnel, même celui de la vie, qu'il ne soit prêt à faire à l'intérêt de la France.

Fait au palais de Fontainebleau, le 11 avril, 1814.

Signé NAPOLEON.

Pour copie conforme,

Signé DUPONT (de Nemours), secrétaire-général du gouvernement provisoire.

(H)

Traité Secret avec Napoléon.

Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon, d'une part, et Sa Majesté l'empereur de toutes les Russies, l'empereur d'Autriche et de Bohême, et le roi de Prusse, stipulant tant en leur nom qu'en celui de tous leurs alliés de l'autre.

ayant nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir : Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon, le sieur Armand-Augustin-Louis Coulaïncourt, Duc de Vicence, Michel Ney, duc d'Elchingen, et Jacques-Etienne-Alexandre Macdonald, duc de Tarente; et Sa Majesté l'empereur de toutes les Russies, le sieur Charles-Robert comte Nessel-rode.

Les plénipotentiaires ci-dessus nommés, après avoir procédé à l'échange de leurs pleins-pouvoirs respectifs, sont convenus des articles suivans :

1. Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon renonce, pour lui et ses successeurs en descendance, ainsi que pour chacun des membres de sa famille, à tout droit de souveraineté, de domination, tant sur l'empire français, le royaume d'Italie, que sur tout autre pays.

2. Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon et l'impératrice Maria-Louise conserveront ces titres et qualités, pour en jouir leur vie durant; la mère, les frères, sœurs, neveux et nièces de l'empereur conserveront également, partout où ils se trouveront, les titres de princes de sa famille.

3. L'île d'Elbe adoptée par l'empereur Napoleon pour le lieu de son séjour, formera, sa vie durant, une principauté séparée, qui sera possédée par lui en toute souveraineté et propriété; il sera donné en outre, en toute propriété à l'empereur Napoléon, un revenu annuel de deux millions de francs en rentes sur le grand-livre de France, dont un million reversible sur l'impératrice.

4. Toutes les puissances s'engagent à employer leurs bons offices, pour fair respecter par les Barbaresques, le territoire et pavillon de l'île d'Elbe, et pour que dans ces rapports avec les Barbaresques, elle soit assimilée à la France.

5. Les duchés de Parmé, Plaisance et Guastalla seront

donnés en toute propriété et souveraineté, à Sa Majesté l'impératrice Marie-Louise; ils passeront à son fils et à sa descendance en ligne directe: le prince, son fils, prendra, dès ce moment, le nom de prince de Parme, Plaisance et Guastalla.

6. Il sera réservé dans les pays auxquels l'empereur Napoléon renonce pour lui et sa famille, des domaines ou donné des rentes sur le grand-livre de France, produisant un revenu net et annuel, et deduction faite de toutes charges, de 2,500,000 francs. Ces domaines, ou rentes, appartiendront en toute propriété, et pour en disposer comme bon leur semblera, aux princes et princesses de sa famille, et seront répartis entr'eux de manière à ce que le revenu de chacun soit dans la proportion suivante.

SAVOIR :

A Madame-Mère.....	300,000 fr.
Au roi Joseph et à la reine.....	500,000
Au roi Louis.....	200,000
A la reine Hortense et à ses enfans.....	400,000
Au roi Jérôme et à la Reine.....	500,000
A la princesse Elisa.....	300,000
A la princesse Pauline.....	300,000

Les princes et les princesses de la famille de l'empereur conserveront en outre tous les biens meubles et immeubles de quelque nature que ce soit qu'ils possèdent à titre particulier et notamment les rentes dont ils jouissent également comme particuliers sur le grand livre de France, ou le mont Napoléon de Milan.

7. Le traitement annuel de l'impératrice Josephine, sera réduit à un million en domaines ou en inscriptions sur le grand livre de France: elle continuera à jouir en toute propriété de ses biens meubles et immeubles particuliers, et pourra en disposer conformément aux lois françaises.

8. Il sera donné au prince Eugène, vice-roi d'Italie, un établissement convenable hors de France.

9. Les propriétés que Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon possède en France, soit comme domaine extraordinaire soit comme domaine privé, resteront à la couronne,

Sur les fonds placés par l'empereur Napoléon, soit sur le grand livre, soit sur la banque de France, soit sur les actions des forêts, soit de toute autre manière et dont Sa Majesté fait l'abandon à la couronne, il se réserve un capital qui n'excédera pas deux millions, pour être employé en gratifications, en faveur de personnes qui seront portées sur l'état que signera l'empereur Napoléon et qui sera réuni au gouvernement français.

10. Tous les diamans de la couronne resteront à la France.

11. L'empereur Napoléon fera retourner au trésor et aux autres caisses publiques toutes les sommes et effets qui en auraient été déplacés par ses ordres, à l'exception de ce qui provient de la liste civile.

12. Les dettes de la maison de Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon, telles qu'elles se trouvent au jour de la signature du présent traité, seront immédiatement acquittées sur les arrerages dus par le trésor public, à la liste civile, d'après les états qui seront signés par un commissaire nommé à cet effet.

13. Les obligations du mont Napoléon de Milan, envers tous ses créanciers, soit Français, soit étrangers, seront exactement remplies, sans qu'il soit fait aucun changement à cet égard.

14. On donnera tous les saufs conduits nécessaires pour le libre voyage de S. M. l'empereur Napoléon, l'impératrice, des princes et princesses et de toutes les personnes

de leur suite qui voudront les accompagner, ou s'établir hors de France, ainsi que pour le passage de tous les équipages, chevaux et effets qui leur appartiennent. Les puissances alliées donneront en conséquence des officiers et quelques hommes d'escorte.

15. La garde impériale française fournira un détachement de 12 à 1500 hommes de toute arme pour servir d'escorte jusqu'à St. Tropès, lieu de l'embarquement.

16. Il sera fourni une corvette armée, et les bâtimens nécessaires pour conduire au lieu de sa destination Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon ainsi que toute sa maison; la corvette demeurera en toute propriété à Sa Majesté.

17. Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon pourra emmener avec lui et conserver pour sa garde, 400 hommes de bonne volonté, tant officiers que sous-officiers et soldats.

18. Tous les Français qui auront suivi Sa Majesté l'empereur Napoléon ou sa famille, seront tenus s'ils ne veulent perdre leur qualité de Français, de rentrer en France dans le terme de trois ans, à moins qu'ils ne soient compris dans les exceptions, que le gouvernement français se réserve d'accorder après l'expiration de ce terme.

19. Les troupes polonaises de toute arme, qui sont au service de France, auront la liberté de retourner chez elles en conservant armes et bagages, comme un témoignage de leurs services honorables: les officiers, sous-officiers, soldats conserveront les decorations qui leur ont été accordées et la pension affectée à ces decorations.

20. Les hautes puissances alliées garantissent l'exécution de tous les articles du présent traité, il s'engagent à obtenir qu'ils soient adoptés et garantis par la France.

21. Le présent traité sera ratifié.

Fait à Paris, le 11 Avril, 1814.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Declaration of the Allies.

“ The powers who have signed the Treaty of Paris, assembled at the Congress at Vienna, being informed of the escape of Napoleon Buonaparte, and of his entrance into France with an armed force, owe it to their own dignity and the interest of social order, to make a solemn declaration of the sentiments which this event has excited in them.

“ By thus breaking the convention, which has established him in the Island of Elba, Buonaparte destroys the only legal title, on which his existence depended ; by appearing again in France, with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe, that there can be neither peace nor truce with him.

“ The powers positively declare, that Napoleon Buonaparte has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations ; and that, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance.

“ They declare, at the same time, that firmly resolved to maintain entire the Treaty of Paris, of 30th May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall hereafter resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will employ all their means, and will unite all their efforts, that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled ; and to guarantee against every attempt which shall threaten to replunge the world into the disorders and miseries of revolutions.

“ And although entirely persuaded that all France, rallying round its legitimate sovereign, will immediately anni-

hilate this last attempt of a criminal and impotent delirium, all the sovereigns of Europe, animated by the same sentiments, and guided by the same principles, declare, that if, contrary to all calculations, there should result from this event any real danger, they will be ready to give to the King of France, and to the French nation, or to any other government, that shall be attacked, as soon as they shall be called upon, all the assistance requisite to restore public tranquillity, and to make a common cause against all those who should undertake to compromise it.

“The present Declaration, inserted in the Register of the Congress, assembled at Vienna, on the 13th March, 1815, shall be made public.

“Done and attested by the Plenipotentiaries of the High Powers, who signed the Treaty of Paris, Vienna, 13th March, 1815.”

AUSTRIA.—Prince Metternich, Baron Wissenberg.

FRANCE.—Prince Talleyrand, the Duke of Dalberg, Latour, du Pin, Count Alexis and Noailles.

GREAT BRIT. Wellington, Clancarty, Cathcart, Stewart.

PORTUGAL. Counts Pamella, Saldanha, Chevalier Lobo.

PRUSSIA.—Prince Hardenberg, Baron Humboldt.

RUSSIA.—Count Rasumowsky, Count Stacekelberg, Count Nesselrode.

SPAIN.—P. Gomez Labrador.

SWEDEN.—Löwezhielm.

(K)

Réponse faite, le 1^{er} janvier 1814, par Napoléon, au rapport de la commission extraordinaire du Corps législatif.

Da 23 décembre 1813.

MESSIEURS LES DÉPUTÉS,

Je vous ai appelés autour de moi pour faire le bien :

vous avez fait le mal. Vous avez parmi vous des gens dévoués à l'Angleterre, à l'étranger, qui correspondent avec le prince régent par l'entremise de l'avocat *Desèze*. Les onze-douzièmes parmi vous sont bons, les autres sont des factieux. Retournez dans vos départemens, je suivrai de l'œil ceux qui ont de mauvaises intentions. Vous avez cherché à m'humilier ! Je suis un homme qu'on peut tuer, mais qu'on ne sauroit deshonerer. Quel est celui d'entre vous qui pourroit supporter le fardeau du pouvoir ? Il a écrasé l'assemblée constituante qui dicta des lois à un monarque foible. Le faubourg Saint-Antoine vous auroit secondé, mais il vous eût bientôt abandonné. — Que sont devenus les *Jacobins*, les *Girondins*, les *Vergniaux*, *Gaudet*, et tant d'autres ? Ils sont morts. Vous avez cherché à me barbouiller aux yeux de la France, c'est un attentat. Qu'est-ce que le trône, au reste ? quatre morceaux de bois dorés recouverts de velours. Et moi aussi je suis sorti du peuple, et je sais les obligations que j'ai contractées. Ce n'étoit point au moment où les étrangers occupent nos provinces, et que deux cent mille Cosaques sont près d'inonder nos plaines qu'il falloit faire des remontrances. Je sais qu'il y a eu des abus, et jamais je n'ai souffert ceux que j'ai connus. *M. Renouard* a dit que le prince *Massena* avoit volé la Bastide à Marseille, il a menti ; le général a pris possession d'une maison vacante, et le ministre fera indemniser le propriétaire. Humilie-t-on ainsi un maréchal de France qui a versé son sang et blanchi sous la victoire — Je vous avois indiqué un comité secret ; c'étoit là qu'il falloit représenter vos doléances, établir des faits ; je vous aurois rendu justice. C'étoit en famille qu'il falloit laver notre linge, et non sous les yeux du public. J'ai

été appelé deux fois au trône par le vœu de vingt quatre millions de Français. J'ai un titre, vous n'en avez pas. Qu'êtes-vous dans la Constitution? vous n'êtes rien. Vous n'avez aucune autorité; *c'est le trône qui est la Constitution, tout est dans le trône.*—On a mêlé l'ironie aux reproches. Suis-je fait pour être humilié? Je sais supporter l'adversité avec noblesse. Vous me demandez des concessions que mes ennemis même ne me demanderoient pas; s'ils me demandoient la Champagne, vous voudriez que je leur cédassee la Brie.—Dans quatre mois j'aurai la paix, et les ennemis seront chassés, *ou je serai mort*, Vous appartient-il de délibérer sur de si graves intérêts?—Je vous le répète, vous avez parmi vous des factieux. Ne sais-je pas combien il est facile de remuer une grande assemblée: l'un se met là, l'autre se met ici, et la délibération est conduite par des agitateurs. Au lieu de nous réunir tous, vous nous avez désunis. Vous m'avez mis seul en face des étrangers, en disant que c'est à moi seul qu'ils font la guerre; c'est une atrocité. Vous vous dites les représentans de la nation, mais vous n'êtes que des députés au Corps législatif. Vous avez éloigné les gens que tiennent au gouvernement dans vos nominations, cela ne prouve-t-il pas de mauvaises intentions? Vous avez nommé votre commission extraordinaire, celle des finances, celle de l'adresse, et vous avez choisi mes ennemis.

M. Laine, je le répète, est un méchant homme; les autres sont des factieux. Je rends justice aux onze douzièmes, qui, je l'ai dit, sont bons; mais je connois les méchans, et je les poursuivrai. Je vous le demande, étoit-ce pendant que les ennemis sont chez nous qu'il falloit faire de pareilles choses? La nature m'a donné d'un courage fort, il peut résister à tout. Il en a beaucoup coûté à

mon orgueil.—Je l'ai sacrifié ; mais je suis au-dessus de vos misérables déclamations. J'avais besoin de consolations, et vous m'avez déshonoré.—Mais non, mes victoires écrasent vos criailleries.

J'attendois que vous seriez réunis d'intention et d'efforts pour chasser l'ennemi, vous l'avez appelé. J'avais conclu la paix en acceptant les conditions de l'ennemi et c'est vous qui l'avez fait changer. J'aurois perdu deux batailles que cela n'eût pas fait plus de mal à la France. Sous trois ou quatre mois nous aurons la paix, et vous vous repentirez de votre mauvaise conduite. Je suis de ces gens qui triomphent ou qui meurent. Je porte dans mon cœur les onze douzièmes d'entre vous.

Retournez dans vos départemens. Je ferai quelque jour imprimer le rapport de vos commissions, et il sera jugé ce qu'il est. S'il paroît dans vos départemens, je le ferai imprimer dans le *Moniteur* avec des notes. Je ferai nommer les députés des deux séries qui manquent, et je réunirai le Corps législatif. Les habitans de l'Alsace et de la Franche-Comté ont un meilleur esprit que vous ; ils me demandent des armes, je leur en fais donner. Je leur envoie de mes aides-de-camp pour les conduire en partisans.

THE END.

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